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Abstract 
 
 
Tunneling behavior, which is defined as the transfer of assets and profits out of a 
firm for the benefit of the firm’s controlling shareholders, has become the focus of 
increasing    attention in the theoretical and empirical literature. There are some corporate 
governance procedures, however, that help to protect investors against tunneling. This 
paper applies agency theory to study how the two basic mechanisms - legal protection on 
investor rights and ownership concentration – work together to constrain tunneling in a 
system of corporate governance. Analytical results in this paper show that tunneling is 
negatively related to the effectiveness of investor protection, while the relation between 
tunneling and ownership concentration is non-monotonic because both outcomes are 
determined by fundamentals including the effectiveness of investor protection, firm 
return and volatility of return, firm size, controllers’ attitude towards risk, etc. 
After describing the theoretical framework in detail, the rest of the dissertation is 
taken up in assembling and assessing various pieces of evidence to see whether or not the 
predictions from the model are consistent with empirical evidence. I discuss several well-
known cases of tunneling in the U.S. and Western European countries to show how 
tunneling happens in developed countries with good law enforcement and how tunneling 
is treated differently by different legal systems. 
The model makes several predictions about the determinants of corporate 
ownership concentration that are examined empirically. I study both cross-country and 
within-country variations in corporate ownership concentration with two newly 
constructed data sets. The first dataset contains 3875 public companies across states in 
the U.S. over a 10-year period (1992~2002) and the second dataset covers 1070 stock 
companies across 45 countries (regions) in a 10-year period (1992~2002). I find that 
corporate ownership concentration varies systematically with the effectiveness of 
investor protection and with firm-specific fundamentals such as firm size, firm return, 
and volatility of firm return in ways that are consistent with the model’s predictions. 
 
JEL classification: G34; G32; D23; K49; L25; O51 
 
Keywords: Tunneling, investor protection, ownership concentration, corporate 
governance 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Tunneling behavior, which is defined as the transfer of assets and profits out of a 
firm for the benefit of the firm’s controlling shareholders1, has become the focus of 
increasing attention in the literature.  Researchers have documented that tunneling is 
pervasive. For instance, Bertrand et al. (2002) find significant amounts of tunneling when 
looking into data on Indian business groups. Johnson et al. (2000a) document incidents of 
tunneling in “emerging markets” during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. Tunneling 
occurs not only in emerging markets. For example, Johnson et al. (2000b) show how 
tunneling occurs in developed countries with good law enforcement. 
There are some corporate governance procedures, however, that help to protect 
investors against tunneling. Certain legal institutions limit tunneling by making it costly 
for the firm’s controlling shareholders (“controllers” thereafter). For instance, the right to 
sue the controllers of the firm constrains their discretionary power and, with it, the ability 
to divert value out of the firm (Zingales (1995)) and so does any right attributed to 
minority shareholders (La Porta et al. (“LLSV” thereafter), (1997, 1998)). Ownership 
arrangement is another important governance mechanism to constrain tunneling. 
Ownership concentration on the firm’s controllers can align controllers’ interest with the 
firm and may, as a result, reduce tunneling. How do these mechanisms work to constrain 
tunneling, and how are they inter-related in a system of corporate governance? These 
questions haven’t been fully answered in the literature. 
                                                 
1 Johnson et al. (2000b). 
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 In this dissertation, a model that builds upon the principal-agent theory is 
developed to understand the impact of investor protection and ownership concentration 
on tunneling behavior. Following Johnson et al. (2000b), tunneling in this paper is used 
narrowly to refer to the transfer of resources out of a company to its controllers, and “it 
does not cover other agency problems, such as incompetent management, placement of 
relatives in executive positions, excessive or insufficient investment, or resistance to 
value-increasing takeovers”. According to Johnson et al. (2000b), tunneling comes in two 
forms: 
 
“First, a controlling shareholder can simply transfer resources from 
the firm for his own benefit through self-dealing transactions. Such 
transactions include outright theft or fraud, which are illegal everywhere 
though often go undetected or unpunished, but also assets sales, contracts 
such as transfer pricing advantageous to the controlling shareholder, 
excessive executive compensation, loan guarantees, expropriation of 
corporate opportunities, and so on. Second, the controlling shareholder can 
increase his share of the firm without transferring any assets through 
dilutive share issues, minority freeze-outs, insider trading, creeping 
acquisitions, or other financial transactions that discriminate against 
minorities”. 
 
The proposed model in this dissertation pertains to the first form of tunneling 
more than the second form. In the model, tunneling is restricted by two basic mechanisms 
in a system of corporate governance: legal protection on investor rights and ownership 
concentration on the controllers. The model provides conditions under which the problem 
of tunneling can be resolved completely (zero tunneling in equilibrium), while under 
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other circumstances, it can only be resolved partially and positive tunneling exists in 
equilibrium due to the risk-averseness of the controllers. The model clearly predicts that 
the level of tunneling in equilibrium is higher (lower) if the legal institutions protect 
investor rights less (more) effectively. Comparatively, the relation between tunneling and 
ownership concentration is non-monotonic. This is because the effect of ownership 
concentration on tunneling is two-fold: on one hand, it aligns the controllers’ interest to 
the firm, and thus reduces tunneling (the alignment effect); on the other hand, it 
introduces uncertainty to the income of the risk-averse controllers, and thus induces 
tunneling (the risk-aversion effect). The optimal level of ownership concentration equates 
the marginal effects of these two opposite effects and maximizes the firm value by 
minimizing tunneling in equilibrium. 
It has long been argued in the literature that ownership concentration is 
endogenously determined. However, there has been no consensus on how ownership 
structure is endogenized in a firm. For example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) propose that 
the structure of corporate ownership varies systematically in ways that are consistent with 
value maximization, while another study by Himmelberg et al. (1999) argues that 
corporate ownership structure is explained by key variables in the contracting 
environment in ways consistent with the predictions of principal-agent models. In this 
dissertation, a firm’s ownership concentration is endogenous as the result of investors’ 
attempt in the financial asset market to maximize the firm value by minimizing the 
controllers’ tunneling. Therefore, corporate ownership concentration is endogenized in 
ways that are consistent with both value maximization and the agency theory. The model 
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predicts explicitly that the equilibrium ownership concentration in a firm is negatively 
related to the effectiveness of investor protection. The model also shows what firm-
specific fundamentals affect corporate ownership structure and how2. 
After describing the theoretical framework in detail, the rest of the dissertation is 
taken up in assembling and assessing various pieces of evidence to see whether or not the 
predictions from the model are consistent with empirical regularities. Existing evidence 
on tunneling is primarily from developing countries or civil-law countries where investor 
protection is believed to be weak in relative to advanced common-law countries such as 
the U.S. and U.K., a phenomenon that is consistent with the model prediction. On the 
other hand, the model also suggests that as far as the investor protection is imperfect and 
firm controllers are sufficiently risk-averse, tunneling is likely to occur even in advanced 
common-law countries, as shown by recent market events in the U.S. In chapter two, I 
discuss several well-known cases of tunneling in the U.S. and Western European 
countries to show how tunneling takes place in developed countries with good law 
enforcement and how tunneling is treated differently by different legal systems. 
Even though it is difficult to obtain data that quantify tunneling systematically in 
the real world, the theoretical framework in this paper generates testable implications that 
take the form of a number of predicted relations between corporate ownership 
concentration, various firm level variables, and institutional variables that proxy for the 
effectiveness of investor protection. These predictions are examined empirically using 
two newly constructed data sets: 
                                                 
2 These firm level determinants overlap considerably with variables included in Demsetz and Lehn (1985)’s 
empirical study. 
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The first data set contains firm-specific financial information of 3875 public 
companies from 51 states in the U.S. over a period of 10 years (1992~2002). OLS and IV 
estimations show that corporate ownership concentration varies systematically with the 
effectiveness of law enforcement in a state and certain firm-specific fundamentals in 
ways that are consistent with the model’s predictions. These findings provide new 
insights on the determinants of corporate ownership concentration in the United States. 
The second empirical study (chapter four) extends Demsetz and Lehn (1985)’s 
results and studies the determinants of corporate ownership concentration across 
countries using a newly constructed data set of 1070 publicly traded stock companies 
from 45 countries around the world in a 10-year period (1992~2002). OLS and IV 
estimation results show that corporate ownership concentration varies systematically with 
respect to certain firm-specific economic variables and country characteristics in ways 
that are consistent with both value maximization and predictions of the agency theory. 
For example, it is found in this study that after controlling for firm-level determinants 
such as firm size, auditing practice, return rate, etc, corporate ownership concentration is 
significantly lower in countries with more developed stock market and more effective 
investor protection. These results provide strong evidence in support of the model 
outlined in chapter one and are consistent with La Porta et al. (1999)’s idea that 
ownership concentration is a substitute for legal institutions as a mechanism to protect 
investor rights. These findings are robust across different model specifications and 
variable measurements. 
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The dissertation is organized as follows. The model is sketched in chapter one. 
Chapter two studies tunneling in the real world with case studies. Chapter three examines 
empirically the model predictions on the determination of corporate ownership 
concentration using a sample of 3875 U.S. public companies across states. Chapter four 
studies corporate ownership concentration using a cross-country sample of 1070 stock 
companies around the world in a 10-year period. 
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1. A Model on Tunneling 
 
Abstract 
 
A model that draws on the principal-agent theory is developed to understand 
tunneling and its relations to investor protection and ownership concentration in this 
chapter. The model suggests that when the controlling shareholders are sufficiently risk-
averse and when there is sizeable uncertainty involved in the firm return, the problem of 
tunneling cannot be resolved completely through legal protection and ownership 
arrangement. Tunneling in equilibrium is negatively related to the effectiveness of 
investor protection, while both tunneling and ownership concentration are endogenously 
determined by a set of firm fundamentals and investor protection in the environment. The 
model shows precisely what factors determine the level of tunneling and ownership 
concentration in equilibrium and how. 
 
1.1. Introduction and Related Research 
 
In this chapter I apply agency theory to study tunneling and its relations to 
investor protection and ownership concentration in a firm. I argue that legal protection on 
investor rights and ownership concentration are the two basic mechanisms to protect 
investors against tunneling in a system of corporate governance. Analytical results show 
that tunneling in equilibrium is negatively related to the effectiveness of investor 
protection, while the relation between tunneling and ownership concentration is non-
monotonic because ownership concentration is endogenous and because firm controllers 
are risk-averse. In equilibrium, both tunneling and ownership concentration are 
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endogenously determined by a set of firm-level economic variables and the effectiveness 
of investor protection in the environment. 
This paper builds upon and attempts to make contributions to two related 
literatures. The first is the recently emerging literature on tunneling and its relation to the 
legal protection on investor rights (for example, LLSV (1997, 1998, 1999, 2002), 
Johnson et al. (2000a, b), Bertrand et al. (2002), Himmelberg et al. (2001)). 
The term tunneling is coined originally to characterize the expropriation of 
minority shareholders in the Czech Republic. Johnson et al. (2000b) use the term to 
describe the transfer of assets and profits out of the firms for the benefit of those who 
control them. Bertrand et al. (2002) provide direct evidence of tunneling in India and 
propose an empirical measure of tunneling. Similar behavior has also been under 
investigation in the literature of law and finance. LLSV (2002) and Johnson et al. (2000a) 
propose a similar model structure to examine the relation between legal protection on 
investor rights and “stealing” by the firm’s managers from minority shareholders. The 
current study borrows from these papers the assumption that investor protection can be 
modeled as a parameter in a cost-of-tunneling technology that makes it costly (to varying 
degrees) for those who control the firm to tunnel from minority shareholders. Different 
from LLSV (2002) and Johnson et al. (2000a) in which cost of stealing is assumed to be 
unrelated to firm characteristics, in this paper, the cost of tunneling varies with firm 
characteristics such as the volatility of the firm’s rate of return. In addition, in LLSV 
(2002) and Johnson et al. (2000a), ownership concentration is treated as exogenous, 
while in my model, corporate ownership concentration is endogenous, i.e., an outcome of 
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the interactions between minority and controlling shareholders in the financial asset 
market. Furthermore, their models do not use a principal-agent structure, and uncertainty 
does not play a role in shaping a firm’s ownership structure.  
Unlike LLSV (2002) and Johnson et al. (2000a) in which legal protection on 
investor rights is the only way to constrain “stealing”, my model suggests that the owners 
of the firm (i.e., the large group of non-controllers) have some power to preclude 
expropriation of their assets. To some extent, ownership concentration is a substitute for 
investor protection as a device that induces the firm controllers to engage in lower levels 
of tunneling. Thus, owners will strive to pick an optimal corporate ownership structure 
that effectively attenuates tunneling, and thereby maximizes firm value. In this context, a 
well-developed financial asset market in which the small group of controllers does not 
dominate the larger group of investors plays an important disciplinary role in limiting 
tunneling. 
The second literature that this paper fits in is the principal-agent analysis of 
corporate governance. Starting with the pioneering work of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) 
and Jensen and Meckling (1976), traditional agency problems, such as incompetent 
management, excessive or insufficient investment, or resistance to value-increasing 
takeovers, have been under extensive investigations. This paper borrows the basic 
analytic structure from agency theory to address the issue of tunneling. 
In this paper, large shareholders are modeled as a firm’s controllers. The 
controllers have stronger financial stakes in the firm than the large group of small 
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shareholders, and consequently, they either participate in the management directly3 or 
they make considerable efforts to monitor the firm’s managers4. Therefore, large 
shareholders either actually do the tunneling or condone it. Small shareholders, unlike 
large shareholders, are “free riders” in the sense that they do not spend much time 
monitoring managers. Their rights are in principle protected by legal institutions, for 
instance, particular laws on the books, regulatory agencies, etc. Small shareholders can 
also “vote with their feet” and liquidate their assets in the financial markets. In this 
model, the potential moral hazard problem is that controllers (the agent) may use 
tunneling to expropriate investors (the principal), especially the small shareholders. 
  
1.2. The Model 
 
In this section, I introduce a simple framework for analyzing the determinants of 
tunneling as well as corporate ownership concentration. Consider a firm with common 
equity, E . This firm is owned by the controller5 and the larger group of small 
shareholders. The controller owns share α of the firm’s equity and can possibly engage in 
tunneling. Denote the amount of resources being tunneled out of the firm by the 
controller as T , and T  is constrained to be greater than zero and less than E , meaning 
                                                 
3 LLSV (2002) find that large shareholders are major directors for most of the firms in their cross-country 
sample. 
4 Demsetz (1983) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) propose that the existence of large shareholders leads to 
better monitoring of managers. Also, see Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) for empirical evidence. 
5 For simplicity, the small group of controllers is treated as one person in the model thereafter. 
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that the controller won’t put extra money into the firm (negative tunneling)6 and the 
controller can’t possibly tunnel more than the firm’s common equity. The controller 
invests the rest of the firm’s equity in a project that yields a rate of return r , where r is a 
normally distributed random variable with expected value R and variance V , and 
. [ ]1,0∈R
Tunneling is costly (for example, other people need to be paid off) due to the 
existence of certain legal institutions that are designed to protect investor rights. The cost 
of tunneling depends on a measure of the lack of investor protection, denoted . Lower 
value of  indicates better investor protection. The firm-specific variable that affects the 
cost of tunneling is the volatility of the rate of return, V . Uncertainty of the firm return 
creates tunneling opportunities because it makes it possible that tunneling goes 
undetected. Also assume that the marginal cost of tunneling is positive and increasing. 
Let C and 
p
p
T  denote the cost of tunneling and the level of tunneling. Then, C ≡ 
is a well-defined function: ),,( VpTC
),,( VpTC > 0, continuous and second order differentiable; 
0),,( >VpTCT , 0),,( <VpTC p , ( ) 0,, <VpTCV . 
Furthermore, the second derivatives are well behaved, i.e., the single crossing 
property holds: 
0>TTC , , and 0<TpC 0<TVC . 
                                                 
6 A recent working paper by Friedman et al. (2003) suggests that under certain conditions, entrepreneurs 
prop up their firms, i.e., they use their private funds to benefit minority shareholders. However, such 
“propping” seems to be confined to very special circumstances in countries with weak legal institutions. 
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The following functional form of is employed and it satisfies all the 
above conditions: 
),,( VpTC
pV
TVpTC
2
),,(
2
=        (1) 
The firm’s governance structure in this model can be depicted by the following 
Figure: 
Tunneling 
 
Figure 1: Governance Structure in a Firm 
 
The model has two dates: date 1 and date 2 in timely order. At date 2, the 
controller diverts T out of the firm and incurs cost . He/she then invests the rest of the 
firm’s equity in a project that yields a rate of return, 
C
r . The controller owns share α of 
the total return. The controller treatsα , r and p as exogenous, and chooses T to 
maximize his/her expected utility. At date 1, investors (the large group of small investors 
Legal Protection on Investor Rights 
Monitoring 
Small  
Shareholders 
 
)1( α−  
Managers 
Firm 
Controllers 
(α  ) 
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and the controller) pick the corporate ownership structure. These two groups interact in 
this first stage and maximize the expected firm value subject to the participation 
constraints of both groups. Consistent with this value-maximization, an optimal α is 
chosen in the financial asset market and the controller’s expected tunneling behavior at 
date 2 is taken into consideration during this process. Therefore, in this model, the degree 
of ownership concentration on the controller,α , is endogenous as the outcome of the 
interactions between the controller and small shareholders of the firm. 
The controller’s financial assets are more deeply entrenched in the firm. Small 
shareholders typically have less money in one firm per person and can diversify their 
investments effectively. As a result, they have lower level of exposure to firm-specific 
risks (unsystematic risks). I capture this distinction by modeling the controller as being 
risk averse when he/she chooses the amount of tunneling, while taking the overall group 
of investors in the first stage to be risk neutral. Assume that the controller has the 
constant absolute risk aversion utility function: 
        (2) aWeWU −−=)(
In equation (2), is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and W is the 
controller’s income. At date 2, the controller’s income is given by: 
0>a
 ( )( )
pV
TTTErW
2
1
2
−+−+= α      (3) 
Since r is a normally distributed random variable in (3), W is also a normally 
distributed random variable with the following expected value and variance: 
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 [ ] ( )( )
pV
TTTERWE
2
1
2
−+−+= α      (4) 
 ( ) ( ) VTEWVariance 22 −= α       (5) 
Solve the model using backward induction. At date 2, the controller maximizes 
his/her expected utility which is equivalent to maximizing his/her expected income net of 
a risk premium: 
 
The controller’s optimization problem at date 2: 
 [ ] ( ) =− WaVarianceWE
T 2
1max       
   ( )( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−+−+ VTEa
pV
TTTER 22
2
2
1
2
1 αα   (6) 
The first-order condition of (6) gives the following maximum solution as in 
equation (7) and one can easily verify that the second-order condition is met. 
 ( ) ( )( )2221 11,,,,, Vpa REVapVREaVpT α αααϕ + +−+==    (7) 
One technical assumption needed to derive the main analytical results of this 
model is inequality (T.1): 
( ){ }aVpRVpVEaVER +−<+ 2,2min1     (T.1) 
This is not a too restrictive assumption, since all it is saying is that the controller 
is sufficiently risk averse and the uncertainty involved in the return of investment is not 
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trivial7. Under this assumption, the numerator of the right hand side of equation (7) is 
always positive, i.e., T is always positive8. 
Investors (the controller and the large group of small shareholders as one group) 
are risk neutral. At date 1, α is chosen by investors in the financial asset market to 
maximize the firm’s expected value9, [ ]ΠE , subject to two constraints: 
 
Investors’ optimization problem at date 1: 
 [ ] ( ) ( )( )αϕα ,,,,,1))(1(max REaVpERTERE −+=−+=Π   (8) 
s.t. 
( )( ) ( ) 0
2
1
2
1 22
2
≥−−−−+−+ EVTEa
pV
TTTER ααα   (PC.1) 
( )( )( ) ( ) 0111 ≥−−−+− ETER αα      (PC.2) 
The first constraint (PC.1) is the participation constraint for the controller. It says 
that the controller’s expected payoff is at least as high as what he/she puts into the firm 
                                                 
7 When the controller is risk neutral, the problem of tunneling is resolved completely (zero tunneling). 
Refer to Appendix A for proof. 
8 The reason why I need the second term in the parentheses of RHS of (T.1) will be discussed later. Also 
notice that T is always lower than E given the second technical condition, (T.2), on page 16. 
9 The optimal is chosen through the interactions between the controller and small shareholders in the 
financial assets market. Any other 
*α α that does not maximize the expected firm value is not sustainable in 
the market. For example, when α is too low, another group of investors with the optimal ownership 
structure will buy out the firm and make a profit from the increase of the firm’s expected value; when α is 
too high, there is pressure from the market to lower it (for instance, Slovin and Sushka (1993) find that 
ownership concentration usually goes down following the death of inside block-holders). Therefore, if 
financial markets are efficient and if such chances of making money through financial transactions are 
exhausted, only the optimal ownership structure is sustainable in the market. Under this scenario, efficient 
financial markets play an important role in determining the corporate ownership structure.  
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initially10. The second constraint (PC.2) is the participation constraint for small 
shareholders. This inequality applies similar constraint for small shareholders as (PC.1) 
does for the controller. (PC.2) can also be interpreted as the “social efficiency criterion”, 
since it ensures that ( ) . In other words, the firm’s existence is justified 
from the social efficiency point of view if (PC.2) holds. To ensure that this is the case, the 
following technical condition is applied: 
( ) ETER ≥−+1
pV
R
RE ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ++> 11        (T.2) 
When (T.2) holds, (PC.2) is satisfied but not binding when  *αα = 11, where  is 
the solution to (8). This implies that, to solve the investors’ optimization problem, (PC.2) 
can be ignored. Whether (PC.1) is binding will be discussed later. For now, assume that 
(PC.1) can also be ignored. 
*α
The optimization problem in (8) is equivalent to minimizing ( )αϕ ,,,,, REaVp in 
(7) by choosingα . Rewrite equation (7) to get the following: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )AERE
Vpa
RpV
Vpa
pVEVpaREaVpT
−=
+
+−+
+== 2222
22
1
1
1
,,,,, α
α
α
ααϕ
  (9) 
The overall effect of ownership concentration (α ) on tunneling can be divided 
into two different effects: the second term on the RHS of (9), denoted AE , entersT with a 
                                                 
10 Without loss of generality, the rate of return on riskless assets for the controller is normalized to be zero. 
This also applies to the small shareholders. 
11 Notice from equation (11) that pVT = when 0=α . The maximum expected firm value 
 is at least as high as[ ] ( )( TERE −+=Π 1 ) ( )( )pVER −+1 , which is bigger than E  from (T.2). 
Since maximizes , (PC.2) is satisfied but not binding when  . *α [ ]ΠE *αα =
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negative sign and it captures the alignment effect, which is that the controller’s income 
is aligned with the firm and this reduces tunneling; the first term on the RHS of (9), 
denoted RE , gives the risk-aversion effect, which indicates that holding the controlling 
stake of the firm exposes the controller’s income to the firm-specific risk and thus 
induces tunneling.  
The optimal α depends on the comparison of the marginal alignment effect 
( MAE ) and the marginal risk-aversion effect ( MRE ) of the ownership concentration 
(α ). MAE and MRE are given by: 
( )( )
( )222
22
1
11
Vpa
VpaRpVAEMAE α
α
α +
−+=∂
∂=     (10) 
( )
( )222
2
1
2
Vpa
pVEVpaREMRE α
α
α +
−=∂
∂=      (11) 
One can easily verify that MAE decreases withα , while MRE increases withα 12. 
The optimal ownership concentration, , equates *α MAE and MRE , as shown in Figure 2: 
                                                 
12 To be exact, the marginal risk-aversion effect ( MRE ) increases monotonically with α in the closed set 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
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1,0
paV
 within which the optimal ownership concentration, , is located (ensured by the 
technical condition, (T.2)). In addition, both 
*α
MRE and MAE are positive whenα is in this set. These 
conclusions may not hold when α is outside the closed set, but this doesn’t affect the main analytical 
results since the optimization of α is all that we care about. 
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 Figure 2: Determination of Ownership Concentration 
 
When α is lower than (Figure 2), the marginal alignment effect dominates the 
marginal risk-aversion effect and thus higher ownership concentration will reduce 
tunneling. However, when 
*α
α gets as high as , further increase of ownership 
concentration will actually lead to more tunneling due to a strong risk-aversion effect. 
There exists an optimal ownership concentration,
*α
( )1,0* ∈α , which minimizes tunneling, 
and consequently, maximizes the expected firm value. 
To examine the optimal ownership concentration further, equate (10) and (11) to 
derive the following: 
( ) ( ) 01221 222 =+−−++ RpaVaEVaVRp ααα    (12) 
From equation (12), it is clear that: 
( REaVp ,,,,* ψα = )        (13) 
Equation (13) shows that ownership concentration in equilibrium depends on how 
effectively investor rights are protected, the firm’s expected rate of return on investment, 
MAE
MRE
α*α  
Marginal 
Effects T
α *α  
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uncertainty of the return, size of the firm’s equity and the controller’s risk attitude. There 
are two solutions for  with opposite signs. The negative solution is not meaningful in 
the real world, and thus only the positive solution of is of interest here. Since 
*α
*α
[ ] 0>∂
Π∂
α
E  when 0=α , the positive solution of (12) is a maximum solution to the 
optimization problem (8). The technical condition (T.1) ensures that is an interior 
solution, i.e. . 
*α
*α
)1,0(*∈α
Total differentiation of (12) reveals further information about ( )⋅ψ . First, total 
differentiation of (12) with respect to and*α p yields: 
( )
( ) 02212
2
2*2
***2*
>−++
−−=∂
∂=
paVaVEaVRp
RaV
pp α
ααααψ    (14) 
pψ has a positive sign. When p rises, both MAE curve and MRE  curve shift 
downward in Figure 2, but the change in MRE  dominates the change in MAE 13. This 
leads to a higher . Recall that *α p measures the lack of investor protection. Therefore, 
this analytical result suggests that ownership concentration on the controller is higher 
(lower) when investor protection is weaker (stronger), which formalizes the proposal in 
LLSV (1997) that ownership concentration is a substitute for legal institutions as a 
mechanism for constraining the expropriation of minority shareholders. 
Similarly, function (15) can be derived from (12): 
0
)1(
2)1(
2*2
**2**
<−++
−++−=∂
∂=
pVEVVRp
pVEVRp
VV α
ααααψ    (15) 
                                                 
13 Detailed proof is available from the author upon request. 
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Vψ has a negative sign given (T.2). Intuitively, higher volatility of the firm return 
indicates higher agency cost due to the risk-averseness of the controller, i.e., the marginal 
risk-aversion effect increases while the marginal alignment effect decreases (in Figure 2, 
MRE curve shifts upward and MAE  curve shifts downward). This results in lower 
ownership concentration. 
As for the relation between and R, the following can be derived from (12): *α
0
22)1(2
1
2*2
2*2*
>−++
−=∂
∂=
paVaEVaVRp
paV
RR α
ααψ   (16) 
The sign of Rψ is positive. The intuition behind this analytical result is that higher 
R makes it more effective to align the controller’s interest with the firm while it has no 
effect on the risk-aversion effect. In Figure 2, when R rises, the MAE curve shifts upward 
and the MRE  curve remains unchanged. This leads to a higher optimal level ofα . 
Therefore, the rate of return affects corporate ownership concentration in a positive way.  
Furthermore, the following expressions about the relation between and , and 
the relation between and 
*α a
*α E  can be derived from (12): 
( ) 0
22)1(2
/1
2*2
*
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αψ   (17) 
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22)1(2
2
2*2
**
<−++−=∂
∂=
paVaEVaVRp
aV
EE α
ααψ   (18) 
Both (17) and (18) can be signed unambiguously, and both have a negative sign. 
The intuition behind these equations is straightforward: both higher risk-averseness and 
bigger size of the firm raise the marginal risk-aversion effect of ownership concentration 
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relatively (when rises, the a MRE curve shifts upward and MAE  curve shifts downward; 
when E increases, MRE  shifts upward and MAE  curve remains unchanged in Figure 2) 
and this leads to a lower . The implication of these results in the real world is also 
straightforward: ownership is less (more) concentrated in a firm with a larger (smaller) 
size or if the firm’s controller is more (less) risk averse. The above findings are 
summarized by proposition 1: 
*α
 
Proposition 1: In a firm with risk-averse controller and risk-neutral investors, 
ownership concentration varies systematically with the following firm-level fundamentals 
and institutional variables in ways that are consistent with both value maximization and 
the agency theory: 
a) ceteris paribus, ownership concentration decreases with the effectiveness of 
investor protection; 
b) ceteris paribus, when firm size increases, ownership concentration decreases; 
c) ceteris paribus, when the firm controller is more (less) risk-averse, ownership 
concentration is lower (higher); 
d) ceteris paribus, expected rate of return is positively related to the firm’s 
ownership concentration, while its volatility has a negative relation with 
ownership concentration. 
 
Now consider the level of tunneling in equilibrium: ( )** ,,,,, αϕ REaVpT = . 
Application of the envelop theorem yields the following analytical results: 
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Inequality (19) holds for obvious reasons: ineffective investor protection (high p ) 
lowers the cost of tunneling and results in high level of tunneling in equilibrium. 
Inequality (20) shows that the controller’s risk-averseness is positively related to 
tunneling. This is so because high risk-averseness raises the risk-aversion effect ( RE ) 
and lowers the alignment effect ( AE ), which leads to higher level of tunneling in 
equilibrium. A change in the firm’s expected rate of return doesn’t affect RE , but it 
affects AE  positively. Therefore, firm return has a negative relation with tunneling in 
equilibrium (inequality (21)). In the case of a firm’s equity size, it doesn’t affect AE , but 
bigger firm size causes RE  to rise, which in turn raises tunneling level in equilibrium. 
Similarly, higher instability of the firm’s rate of return leads to more tunneling in 
equilibrium. 
Proposition 2 summarizes the above discussions: 
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 Proposition 2: In a firm with risk-averse controller and risk-neutral investors: 
a) ceteris paribus, tunneling in equilibrium decreases with the effectiveness of 
investor protection; 
b) ceteris paribus, tunneling in equilibrium increases with firm size; 
c) ceteris paribus, when the firm controller is more (less) risk-averse, tunneling 
in equilibrium is higher (lower); 
d) ceteris paribus, the firm’s expected rate of return is negatively related to 
tunneling in equilibrium, while its volatility has a positive relation with 
tunneling in equilibrium. 
 
Finally, let’s look back and have a discussion about the controller’s participation 
constraint, (PC.1). In this paper we are generally interested in the situation where (PC.1) 
is satisfied and not binding, i.e., both the controller and small shareholders are willing to 
participate in purchasing the equity of the firm. The situation where the existence of the 
firm is in jeopardy is uninteresting. Of course, we need to show that there exists at least 
one compact set for α  in [0, 1] in which (PC.1) is satisfied but not binding. As a sketch 
of the proof, notice that when 0=α , (PC.1) is satisfied but not binding. In other words, 
when the controller doesn’t hold any stake of the firm’s equity, he/she is willing to 
participate to get positive net benefit from tunneling. Since the left-hand side of (PC.1) is 
continuous with respect toα , there exists a range of α in [0, 1], denoted , such that Φ
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(PC.1) is satisfied but not binding when Φ∈α . The main analytical results in this paper 
apply to the situation where . Figure 3 illustrates such a situation: Φ∈*α
Expected
 
Figure 3: Optimal Ownership Concentration and (PC.1) 
 
1.3. Conclusions 
 
In summary, the model sketched in this chapter shows that legal protection and 
ownership concentration are the two basic mechanisms to constrain tunneling in a system 
of corporate governance. When both the controller and the large group of investors are 
risk-neutral or are very close to risk-neutral, the problem of tunneling can be resolved 
completely (zero tunneling in equilibrium)14. However, in a more realistic setting where 
the controller of the firm is sufficiently risk-averse, where there is sizeable uncertainty 
with the rate of return on investment, and where investors as a whole are risk-neutral, 
                                                 
14 Refer to Appendix A for a detailed proof. 
*α α
*T  
Φ∈*α  
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tunneling exists in equilibrium. Given that investor protection is imperfect ( ), some 
degree of tunneling has to be tolerated by investors due to the fact that maintaining a 
controlling ownership block in a firm forces the controller’s wealth to be not as 
diversified as other investors’, and consequently, he/she tunnels to offset his/her exposure 
to firm-specific risks (unsystematic risks). Tunneling in equilibrium decreases with the 
effectiveness of investor protection and the expected rate of return, and it increases with 
firm size, controller’s risk-averseness, and the instability of the firm’s rate of return. In 
equilibrium, corporate ownership concentration is endogenously determined in ways that 
are consistent with both value maximization and the agency theory, and its value depends 
on the effectiveness of investor protection and other firm level fundamentals including 
firm size, the controller’s risk attitude, firm returns, and the volatility of firm returns. 
0>p
This study provides a basic framework for understanding the endogeneity of 
tunneling and ownership concentration, and their relations to investor protection. It leaves 
plenty of room for future research. For instance, this paper doesn’t consider firm-level 
heterogeneities in investor protection. One possible source of this heterogeneity is the 
different auditing practice implemented in different firms. Some firms are under better 
auditing than others. Sound auditing practice may provide extra protection of investor 
rights in addition to the protection from formal legal institutions and thus may change the 
cost function of tunneling. Similar to corporate ownership concentration, such firm-level 
investor protection is likely to be endogenous rather than being exogenous. Future model 
construction should take firm-level heterogeneity in investor protection into 
consideration.
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 2. An Empirical Study on Tunneling 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter shows with case studies how tunneling occurs even in developed 
countries with good law enforcement, and how tunneling is treated differently under 
different legal systems. It echoes Johnson et al. (2000b)’s proposition that English 
common laws are more protective in terms of constraining tunneling than various forms 
of civil-law systems. On the other hand, it is also argued in this chapter that even 
common-law systems are not designed to induce zero violations and tunneling can be a 
significant matter in advanced common-law countries. Tunneling takes various forms in 
the real world and can be pervasive under some circumstances as shown by the case of 
Adelphia Communications Corp. in the U.S. 
 
2.1. Introduction and Related Research 
 
It is difficult to observe and measure tunneling empirically in a systematic way 
because to do that, detailed information about a firm’s transactions with other entities is 
needed to assess whether the controllers are enriched at the expense of the firm’s 
investors. This is especially true in developed market economies due to the continuing 
organizational innovations and rapid emerging of new financial instruments in the 
financial markets. Tunneling can be hidden in a series of indescribably complex financial 
transactions so that it is almost impossible to be detected. Bertrand et al. (2002) propose 
an empirical measurement of tunneling. However, their measurement only takes account 
of tunneling involving transfer pricing within business groups, which is, at best, a subset 
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of tunneling in the real world. Direct evidence on how tunneling takes place in the real 
world is generally confined to case studies in the literature. 
Existing evidence reveals that the theoretical framework and its predictions 
presented in the previous chapter are consistent with a number of empirical regularities. 
One important implication of the model is that there is more (less) tunneling in countries 
where legal institutions provide less (more) effective investor protection. As a matter of 
fact, tunneling is more pervasive in developing countries where the legal system is 
relatively weak than in developed countries with good law enforcement. For instance, 
Bertrand et al. (2002) find significant amount of tunneling when looking into data on 
Indian business groups. Incidents of tunneling were widely observed in “emerging 
markets” during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, as documented by Johnson et al. 
(2000a).  
On the other hand, it should be acknowledged that developed countries are not 
immune to tunneling. The model in chapter one suggests that the occurrence of tunneling 
doesn’t require strong conditions that are specific to developing countries. As far as 
investor protection is imperfect, tunneling is likely to occur. Johnson et al. (2000b) shows 
with case studies that tunneling also happens in developed French civil-law countries 
with good law enforcement since the legal system is less protective in French civil-law 
countries than in English common-law countries. Along this line, the current study goes 
one step further to show how tunneling of some forms are treated differently under 
different legal systems by comparing two cases of tunneling. One case (SARL Peronnet) 
was ruled in favor of the controlling shareholder by a French court, while the attempt to 
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tunnel from minority shareholders was blocked by a U.S. court in the other case (Zapata 
Corp.). 
Tunneling in developed common-law countries such as the U.S. and U.K., has 
received less attention in the literature. In this paper I argue that tunneling is not a trivial 
matter in developed common-law countries, because even in these countries, such legal 
institutions are not designed in a way that attempts to create a situation of zero violations, 
simply because pursuing such an extreme goal would be uneconomic. I draw on the 
recent market events in the U.S. to illustrate the various forms that tunneling takes. 
Special attention is paid to the case of Adelphia Communications Corp. 
 
2.2. How are Civil-law Systems and Common-law Systems Different in 
Terms of Constraining Tunneling? 
 
When tunneling takes the form of outside theft or fraud, it is treated as illegal by 
almost all types of legal systems. However, when tunneling comes in other forms, such as 
asset sales and contracts advantageous to the controlling shareholders, it is not 
necessarily considered as illegal by all courts. A transaction involving tunneling which is 
illegal under one legal system may be ruled legal under another legal system. In general, 
English common-law systems are believed to be more protective of investor’s rights than 
the various civil-law systems (LLSV (1998)). Johnson et al. (2000b) show with several 
cases that sometimes tunneling occurs legally in developed civil-law countries. 
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According to Johnson et al. (2000b), the superiority of common-law systems in 
constraining tunneling is reflected in the following comparisons with various civil-law 
systems: 
 
“[In sum], courts in civil law countries may accommodate more tunneling 
than courts in common law countries because of: 1) a narrower application 
of the duty of loyalty largely to transactions with no business purpose, 2) a 
higher standard of proof in conflict of interest situations, 3) a greater 
responsiveness to stakeholder interests, and 4) a greater reliance on 
statutes rather than fairness to regulate self-dealing transactions.” 
 
While I believe that Johnson et al. (2000b)’s perception about the difference 
between a civil-law system and a common-law system in terms of constraining tunneling 
is right, their proposition can be strengthened by a comparative study of some real-world 
cases that shows how similar situations involving tunneling are actually treated 
differently by courts under different legal systems. Johnson et al. (2000b) document 
several cases about how tunneling can be ruled legal by courts in Western European 
countries with French civil-law origins. However, the other half of the comparison, i.e., 
how similar transactions are ruled by courts under a common-law system, is missing. 
In this section, I examine two cases of tunneling that involve similar transactions: 
SARL Peronnet in France and Zapata Corp. in the U.S. The difference in court rulings on 
these cases reflects the different ways in which certain forms of tunneling are treated by 
the legal system. 
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2.2.1. Case One: SARL Peronnet 
 
For the purpose of comparison, I will first draw on Johnson et al. (2000b) and 
present a well-known case of tunneling in a civil-law system to show how the courts see 
the law in such a system. 
SARL Peronnet is a French company controlled by the Peronnet Family. The 
Peronnet Family later established a new company, SCI, which is solely owned by family 
members. SCI bought some land and took out a loan to build a warehouse. SCI then 
leased the warehouse to SARL Peronnet and used the proceeds to repay the loan. In 1999, 
SAICO, a minority shareholder of SARL Peronnet, sued the Peronnet Family. SAICO 
claimed that the Peronnet Family expropriated minority shareholders of SARL Peronnet 
by giving the leasing contract to an entity (namely, SCI) that was related to the 
controlling shareholder while it was possible for SARL Peronnet to find a cheaper deal 
(for example, the proposal to build a warehouse by SAICO). This situation can be 
depicted by Figure 4. 
As documented by Johnson et al. (2000b), a French court ruled against SAICO 
and held the transaction between SCI and SARL Peronnet legal under French civil law. 
The ruling was on two grounds. First, the court held that the decision by Peronnet to pay 
SCI to warehouse its products was not against the social interests. Second, it held that 
SARL Peronnet expanded its business during the time and its expansion had benefited 
SAICO as well. 
 30
The 
Peronnet 
Family 
 
Figure 4: Control Structure in SARL Peronnet and SCI 
 
It is difficult to speculate on how a court would rule on this case under a common-
law system without an independent valuation on the fairness of the leasing contract. But 
it is interesting to check how the plaintiff, a minority shareholder, had more difficulties to 
successfully challenge the controlling shareholder under a civil-law system than under a 
common-law system in this case: 
First, the French court applied a higher standard of proof in conflict of interest 
situations. It could thus be argued that the decision to build a warehouse through SCI was 
not solely intended to benefit the controlling shareholders (i.e., the Peronnet Family), and 
had a legitimate business purpose that also benefited the minority shareholders. Under 
French law, this was sufficient to rule against SAICO, while in the U.S. or U.K., this 
SCI 
(Solely owned by 
Peronnet Family 
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would not have prevented the plaintiff from proving the existence of conflict of interest 
situation in this case. 
Second, the French court relied on statutes rather than fairness to regulate self-
dealing transactions. As reported in Johnson et al. (2000b), “[The court] took no interest 
in the questions of whether the creation of SCI, and the prices it charged SARL Peronnet 
for the use of the warehouse, were fair to SAICO and other minority shareholders”. As 
long as SAICO (the minority shareholder) has not suffered an actual loss, the law 
protected the Peronnet Family. In the U.S. and U.K., courts would have been very 
suspicious of the conduct of the Peronnet Family unless it could demonstrate that the 
leasing contract was fair through an independent valuation in this case. 
Third, sales of SARL Peronnet expanded during the period of the lawsuit. 
Therefore, the French court held that the decision by Peronnet to pay SCI to warehouse 
its products was not against the social interests. By doing this, the court showed a greater 
responsiveness to stakeholder interests than courts in the U.S. and U.K. would have. In 
contrast, courts in the U.S. and U.K. would have been more focused on whether the 
minority shareholder’s interest was violated by the controlling shareholder in this 
situation. 
 
2.2.2. Case Two: Zapata Corp. 
 
Zapata Corp. (U.S.) was founded in 1953 by former President George Bush as an 
oil-drilling and gas company.  In 1993, financier Malcolm Glazer bought a 32 percent 
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stake in the Company.  Shortly after taking over as Chairman in 1994, Malcolm Glazer 
installed his son, Avram Glazer, as Zapata's Chief Executive, and began to sell off the 
Company's oil and gas interests. Today, the group’s principal activities are to process, 
market and distribute fish meal and fish oil products, and it also supplies automotive 
airbag fabric, cushions and technical fabrics. 
Two Zapata dealings with entities that are related to the Glazer Family in 1990’s 
cast Glazer in a questionable light. In 1994, Malcolm Glazer sold the Company his 31 
percent share of Envirodyne Industries, Inc. ("Envirodyne"), a food-packaging 
manufacturer that primarily makes sausage casings.  The Envirodyne purchase reportedly 
helped finance Malcolm Glazer's 1995 purchase of the National Football League's Tampa 
Bay Buccaneers, and is currently the subject of shareholder litigation.   
Another dispute between the Glazer Family and the minority shareholders of 
Zapata that has been ruled by a court is of more interests here. In 1996, Malcolm Glazer, 
who controlled 45 percent of the Zapata Corp.'s stock, attempted to have the Company 
buy his Houlihan's Restaurants Inc., a string of eateries. Glazer was the 73 percent owner 
of Houlihan’s. The proposed deal invoked a lawsuit against Glazer Family by 
shareholders of Zapata, alleging that Glazer would enrich himself at the expense of 
Zapata from the deal. Minority shareholders of Zapata asked the court to block the deal 
because if the takeover proceeded as being negotiated, Glazer would stand to gain $59 
million at the expense of Zapata. The situation can be depicted by Figure 5. 
 33
 
The Glazer 
Family 
 
Figure 5: Control Structure in Zapata Corp. and Houlihan's Restaurants 
 
A Delaware court ruled against Glazer Family and the deal was blocked. The 
court ruled that the deal had to be approved by 80 percent of Zapata shareholders. The 
court made it clear that the ruling was intended to “protect minority shareholders of 
Zapata from being expropriated by controlling shareholders”15. Glazer Family didn’t 
challenge the court’s ruling and the proposal to sell Houlihan’s Restaurants to Zapata was 
later dropped. 
Would a court under a civil-law system have ruled on this case differently? It is 
hard to conjecture. Some insights can be gained from comparing this case with the way in 
which the French court ruled on SARL Peronnet, though. Had this case been tried under a 
                                                 
15 Glazer v. Pasternak, 693 A.2d 319, 321 (Del. 1997). 
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French civil-law system, the odds for the controlling shareholders to prevail in court 
would have been increased by the following factors: 
First, the defendant could argue that the proposed deal had a legitimate business 
purpose and its intention was not to solely benefit the controlling shareholders. For 
example, the deal could benefit Zapata’s expansion to the restaurant business, and Zapata 
Corp. was generating a healthy return at the time (which it did). In other words, it would 
have been harder for Zapata shareholders to prevail in such a case that involved self-
dealing transaction with a plausible business purpose under a French civil-law system. 
Second, the plaintiffs would have had to work hard to prove that they suffered an 
actual loss since otherwise the French civil-law judgment rule, with an emphasis on legal 
certainty, may end up protecting the Glazer Family. Comparatively, a U.S. court has a 
higher level of judicial discretion to assess the terms of transactions and to make rules. 
This flexibility puts a U.S. court on a better position to rule on the ground of fairness. As 
a consequence, it does a better job in stopping tunneling that involves self-dealing 
transactions with a plausible business purpose. 
 
2.3. Tunneling in Advanced Common-law Countries: A Case in the U.S. 
 
While the point that common-law systems are more protective than civil-law 
systems in terms of constraining tunneling is well taken, it should also be acknowledged 
that tunneling in advanced common-law countries is not a trivial matter. The model in 
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chapter one suggests that as far as investor protection is imperfect, tunneling is likely to 
occur. Effective investor protection requires well-developed legal systems to enforce 
contractual rights. It also requires well-developed accounting systems with integrity since 
investors can not make informed decisions to maximize the value of their investments 
without accurate information about a firm’s fundamentals. Even in developed common-
law countries, such legal institutions and law enforcement are not designed in a way that 
attempts to create a situation of zero violations, simply because pursuing such an extreme 
goal would be uneconomic. 
Recent market events in the U.S. provide plenty of opportunities for us to 
examine how tunneling occurs in an advanced common-law country with good law 
enforcement. One good example is the case of Adelphia Communications Corp. 
 
2.3.1. Case Three: Adelphia Communications Corp. 
 
Adelphia Communications Corp., a Pennsylvania cable company16, was founded 
by John Rigas in 1972. It went public in 1986 and its shares had been widely held and 
traded on NASDAQ since then (until June 3, 2002). By 1999, Adelphia was the 6th 
largest cable company in the U.S. and had expanded to telephone business, sports radio 
station, and sports cable television channel, and had many other smaller subsidiaries in 29 
states and Puerto Rico. 
                                                 
16 The company reincorporated to Colorado in 2003 after the SEC filed the case against the company and 
the Rigas Family. 
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As the founder of Adelphia, the Rigas Family maintained full control over the 
company until May, 2002. John Rigas was the CEO and chairman of the board before 
May, 2002; His son, Tim Rigas, was the CFO; His second son, Michael Rigas, was the 
Vice President of Operations; His third son, James Rigas, was the Vice President of 
Strategic Planning. The family controlled five of the nine members of the board, and it 
owned 77 percent of the company’s voting rights. Adelphia issued Class A shares of 
common stock, which are mainly for public investors, and Class B shares of common 
stock, which have 10 times the voting power of Class A shares and which have been held 
almost exclusively by the Rigas Family. Therefore, the family’s ownership stake in terms 
of Adelphia’s common equity (about 25 percent) was much lower than the votes it 
controlled. 
On July 24, 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed charges 
against John Rigas and his three sons. The Rigas were charged, among other things, for 
having “concealed rampant self-dealing by the Rigas Family, including the undisclosed 
use of corporate funds for Rigas Family stock purchase and the acquisition of luxury 
condominiums in New York and elsewhere”17. While the case is still under prosecution, 
according to files released by the SEC, tunneling has been pervasive in the company 
since at least 1998 and it has taken various forms: 
First, use of company funds to finance undisclosed open market stock purchase by 
the Rigas Family. This includes three open market purchases, occurring respectively on 
October 30, 1999, April 30, 2000, and February 1, 2001, of a total of $59 million of 
                                                 
17 Complaint: SEC v. Adelphia Communications Corp. & Rigas Family, 2002. 
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Adelphia securities by Highland, a general partnership of the Rigas Family, using funds 
that Highland obtained from the Adelphia and for which it never reimbursed or otherwise 
compensated Adelphia. 
Second, assets sales. The Rigas Family paid $464,930 for 3,656 acres of land, 
located in Potter County, Pennsylvania. Later in February 2000, Adelphia paid 
$26,535,070 for the rights to the timber on the property, purportedly consisting of 
valuable hardwood cherry. 
Third, outright theft and fraud. The Rigas Family used approximately $12.8 
million in Adelphia funds for the construction of a golf club and a golf course on land, 
located near Coudersport, Pennsylvania, mostly owned, directly or indirectly, by the 
Rigas Family. In addition, the Rigas Family had enjoyed exclusive use of luxury 
condominiums in Colorado and Mexico, and at least two New York apartments, all of 
which were paid by Adelphia. 
Fourth, payment of personal debt with Adelphia funds. The Rigas Family used 
$241,167,006 Adelphia funds to pay personal margin loans and other debt on behalf of 
the Family. 
Through the transactions and dealings set forth above, the Rigas Family was 
allegedly enriched by at least $300 million at the expense of Adelphia and its 
shareholders. The situation can be depicted by Figure 6. 
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The Rigas 
Family 
 
Figure 6: Adelphia Communications Corp. and the Rigas Family 
 
It is interesting to have a closer look at the timing of tunneling in the case of 
Adelphia. Adelphia became a public company in 1986 and it had been under control of 
the Rigas Family for years, but it seemed that the alleged massive amount of tunneling 
did not occur until late 1990s. What’s special about late 1990s? It was a period of hard 
time for Adelphia. The company was hit by a series of bad news, some of which applied 
to the whole cable industry and the other to Adelphia specifically: technology slowdown, 
slowing economy, increased competition in the cable industry, and over-capacity 
problems faced by Adelphia. Its stock price dropped continuously (Figure 7) and return 
on investment plummeted with increasing risks. The timing of tunneling in the case of 
Adelphia seems to confirm the proposition of the model (chapter one) that tunneling is 
 Highland Holdings, 
Highland 2000, etc. 
(Directly or indirectly 
owned by the Rigas Family)
Adelphia Communications 
Corp. 
(25% ownership stake, 77% 
voting rights by the Rigas 
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more likely to happen when investment in the firm generates lower returns and involves 
higher risks. 
 
 
Adelphia Stock Price (data from http://finance/yahoo.com)
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Figure 7: Adelphia Stock Price since Late 1990s 
 
2.4. Conclusions 
 
Tunneling takes various forms in the real world. While it is true that tunneling is 
more pervasive in developing countries where legal system is weak than in developed 
countries, it also occurs in developed countries with good law enforcement. When 
tunneling takes the form of outside theft or fraud, it is treated as illegal by almost all 
types of legal systems. However, when tunneling comes in other forms, such as asset 
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sales and contracts advantageous to the controlling shareholders, it is not necessarily 
considered illegal everywhere. Generally speaking, English common-law systems are 
more protective than French civil-law systems. As can be shown by the case of SARL 
Peronnet in France and the case of Zapata Corp. in the U.S., courts in common-law 
countries do a better job in stopping tunneling that involves self-dealing transactions with 
a plausible business purpose than courts in civil-law countries. 
Tunneling in developed common-law countries such as in the U.S. and U.K., has 
received inadequate attention in the literature. As the case of Adelphia illustrates, 
tunneling is not a trivial matter even in the U.S. While the model in chapter one provides 
some general assistance in identifying the types of companies where tunneling is more 
likely to occur, a way in which tunneling can be measured systematically in the real 
world is still to be found. Such a measurement is crucial for studying tunneling 
empirically. More work is needed along this line. 
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 3. From Theory to Empirical Assessment: Implications on 
Corporate Ownership Concentration in U.S. Corporations 
 
Abstract 
 
In light of the model’s predictions in the first chapter, this chapter examines the 
determinants of corporate ownership concentration empirically using a newly constructed 
data set that contains 3875 public companies from 51 states in the U.S. during a 10-year 
period (1992-2002). Corporate ownership concentration is found to vary systematically 
with the effectiveness of law enforcement in a state and with firm-specific fundamentals 
such as firm size, firm return, and volatility of firm return in ways that are consistent with 
the theoretical framework outlined in chapter one. 
 
3.1. Introduction and Related Research 
 
The difficulty to obtain systematic data on tunneling in the real world doesn’t 
mean that it is impossible to test the model predictions (chapter one) in a systematic way. 
The theoretical framework presented in the first chapter predicts a number of testable 
relations between corporate ownership concentration, various firm-level variables, and 
variables that proxy for the effectiveness of investor protection (Proposition 1). All these 
variables are empirically measurable, thanks to the new development in the literature of 
law and finance. In this chapter, I examine the determinants of corporate ownership 
concentration empirically using a newly constructed data set that contains 3875 public 
companies from 51 states in the U.S. during a 10-year period (1992-2002). The primary 
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goal is to test systematically whether the firm-level economic fundamentals and the 
effectiveness of investor protection are empirically significant determinants of corporate 
ownership concentration, and whether these variables affect corporate ownership 
concentration in ways that are predicted by the model. In doing this, I also attempt to re-
examine and expand the conventional wisdom on the determinants of corporate 
ownership concentration. 
This study differs from past work in a number of ways. Demesetz and Lehn 
(1985) study determinants of corporate ownership in the U.S. and find that the structure 
of corporate ownership varies systematically in ways that are consistent with value 
maximization. In the current study, I use a dataset that includes more firms (3875 public 
companies in the U.S.) and covers a more recent and longer time range (1992~2002). The 
extended coverage allows us to comment on the robustness of Demesetz and Lehn 
(1985)’s results.  Some of the findings in this paper are consistent with Demesetz and 
Lehn (1985)’s conclusions. For example, similar to Demesetz and Lehn (1985), I find 
that ownership concentration is relatively low in large firms. Other findings in this paper 
are in clear contrast to Demesetz and Lehn (1985)’s results. For instance, my study 
detects significant positive relation between ownership concentration and firm return, and 
negative relation between ownership concentration and the volatility of firm return. More 
important, this study expands Demsetz and Lehn (1985)’s analysis to include state-level 
determinants of ownership concentration in the regressions. I find that corporate 
ownership concentration varies systematically with the effectiveness of law enforcement 
across states in the U.S. after controlling for a large set of covariates. 
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This paper investigates ownership concentration rather than managerial ownership 
(for the latter approach, see Himmelberg et al. (1999), (2001)). The distinction between 
these two concepts has been vague in the literature. In this paper I argue that it is critical 
to distinguish between these two concepts. Ownership concentration measures how a 
firm’s ownership is concentrated on its controllers, while managerial ownership is an 
indictor of the interests of the officers and directors in the firm who are, at best, only a 
potential subset of the controllers. Since large shareholders either participate in 
management directly or are vigorously engaged in monitoring management, ownership 
concentration is a better indicator of the controllers’ interests in a firm than managerial 
ownership18.  
 
3.2. Data and Variable Measurements 
 
One major prediction by proposition 1 (chapter one) to be tested is that corporate 
ownership concentration varies systematically with the effectiveness of investor 
protection after controlling for various firm level economic variables. While several 
cross-country studies (such as LLSV (1999), Himmelberg et al. (2001), and Qu (2004a)) 
have documented positive evidence of a significant relation between ownership structure 
and investor protection, these studies bear the same shortcoming that exists due to various 
                                                 
18 For more discussions about the role of large shareholders in corporate governance, refer to Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986), Agrawal and Mandelker (1990), and Demsetz (1983). Using a cross-country data set, Qu 
(2004a) finds that ownership concentration has a marginally negative correlation with managerial 
ownership. 
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unobservable or unquantifiable heterogeneities in institution, culture and economic 
conditions across countries. This is why recent studies have been focusing more on the 
variation in law enforcement and its economic implications within a country (e.g., 
Laeven and Woodruff (2003), Berkowitz and Clay (2003)). 
If the economic reasoning of the model presented in chapter one is sound, 
tunneling is costly and its cost varies with the legal environment in which the firm 
conducts its business. In a large country such as the U.S., law enforcement varies 
significantly across states. Therefore, the quality of law enforcement in a state where a 
firm’s principal business is located is an important factor in determining how costly it is 
for the controllers to tunnel from the minority shareholders. Consequently, it affects the 
decision-making of both controllers and investors and has an impact on the company’s 
ownership structure. Following this lead, in this chapter, I conduct a within-country study 
and examine the determinants of corporate ownership concentration using a sample of 
public companies across states in the U.S. 
For a within-country and cross-state study to be possible, one important question 
needs to be addressed first: How to measure the effectiveness of investor protection 
across states in the U.S.? 
There are two basic approaches to measure the effectiveness of investor 
protection in the literature: measure of the quality of laws on book, and measure of the 
effectiveness of law enforcement. Empirical studies in the literature didn’t find 
significant variation in the laws on book across states. Therefore, in this study the 
measurement of the effectiveness of investor protection focuses on quantifying the 
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effectiveness of law enforcement across states. This measurement is based on a recent 
study by Berkowitz and Clay (2003). These researchers examine the current and past 
conditions of legal institutions and their enforcements in 48 continental states in America 
and find significant variations in the effectiveness of law enforcement across states. The 
primary measurement of the quality of law enforcement used in Berkowitz and Clay 
(2003) as well as in this paper is corruption. This variable (Corruption) measures the 
federal public corruption convictions by district over 1992 – 2001, per 100,000 
population (measured in 1996). The numeric value of this variable varies significantly 
across states, ranging from 0.41 in Colorado to 7.06 in Mississippi. High numeric value 
of this variable indicates poor investor protection since it will be less costly for the 
controllers to engage in tunneling in a more corruptive environment. A positive relation 
between Corruption and corporate ownership concentration is predicted by the model.  
In addition, to control for the possible effects of other state characteristics on 
corporate ownership concentration in a state, I collect data about per capita income 
(GSP), growth rate (Growth), business tax rate (Tax), and population density (Density) in 
a state. For the first three state characteristics, 10-year average (1992-2002) value is used 
in regressions, while population density in a state is measured in midyear 2000 (Table 1). 
These data are obtained from the Census Bureau and Bureau of Economic Analysis of the 
U.S. Commerce Department. 
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Table 1: State Characteristics 
State name 
Indirect 
business 
tax/GSP 
Real GSP per 
capita 
Growth rate 
of real GSP 
Persons per 
square mile Corruption 
Civil Post-
Rev. Climate 
Alabama 0.07 23304.16 0.03 87.6 3 1 39.73 
Arizona 0.08 25361.60 0.07 45.2 1.55 1 2.19 
Arkansas 0.07 22217.56 0.03 51.3 1.44 1 20.87 
California 0.07 32030.36 0.04 217.2 2.89 1 6.78 
Colorado 0.07 31344.87 0.06 41.5 0.41 0 3.96 
Connecticut 0.08 39061.32 0.03 702.9 2.13 0 14.00 
Delaware 0.06 39740.57 0.04 401.1 2.43 0 16.15 
Florida 0.10 25130.84 0.04 296.4 4.84 1 27.91 
Georgia 0.07 29664.38 0.05 141.4 3.1 0 20.26 
Idaho 0.07 24265.86 0.06 15.6 3.33 0 3.59 
Illinois 0.08 31855.55 0.03 223.4 5.54 0 11.49 
Indiana 0.07 26832.81 0.03 169.5 1.85 0 14.62 
Iowa 0.08 26918.94 0.03 52.4 1.01 0 10.83 
Kansas 0.08 26927.70 0.03 32.9 1.57 0 10.95 
Kentucky 0.08 24761.16 0.03 101.7 4.03 0 16.23 
Louisiana 0.10 26556.31 0.03 102.6 5.98 1 27.92 
Maine 0.10 23910.51 0.03 41.3 3.04 0 13.50 
Maryland 0.07 29447.10 0.03 541.9 1.76 0 15.57 
Massachusetts 0.06 35500.51 0.04 809.8 2.82 0 14.07 
Michigan 0.08 27717.77 0.03 175 1.64 0 10.59 
Minnesota 0.07 31091.02 0.04 61.8 1.25 0 7.18 
Mississippi 0.08 20513.91 0.03 60.6 7.06 1 24.63 
Missouri 0.07 27237.30 0.03 81.2 3.3 1 13.00 
Montana 0.09 21215.28 0.03 6.2 3.5 0 3.65 
Nebraska 0.07 28535.77 0.03 22.3 0.54 0 9.72 
Nevada 0.09 32152.23 0.06 18.2 2.04 0 1.99 
New Hampshire 0.08 30754.95 0.05 137.8 0.6 0 11.77 
New Jersey 0.09 35729.33 0.03 1134.4 3.36 0 15.35 
New Mexico 0.09 26055.58 0.06 15 2.28 1 2.16 
New York 0.09 35363.44 0.03 401.9 4.47 0 12.11 
North Carolina 0.08 27976.16 0.04 165.2 1.37 0 18.24 
North Dakota 0.09 24584.89 0.03 9.3 6.15 0 4.22 
Ohio 0.07 28002.18 0.03 277.3 4.34 0 14.06 
Oklahoma 0.07 22817.69 0.03 50.3 2.6 0 12.82 
Oregon 0.06 29069.32 0.07 35.6 0.77 0 15.73 
Pennsylvania 0.07 27639.46 0.02 274 3.13 0 13.67 
Rhode Island 0.08 27516.78 0.03 1003.2 2.64 0 13.40 
South Carolina 0.07 24125.78 0.04 133.2 3.37 0 20.38 
South Dakota 0.08 26685.55 0.04 9.9 4.58 0 7.99 
Tennessee 0.08 26949.27 0.04 138 3.26 0 20.28 
Texas 0.09 29530.87 0.05 79.6 2.38 1 12.99 
Utah 0.07 24873.00 0.06 27.2 0.77 0 4.03 
Vermont 0.09 25791.53 0.03 65.8 1.68 0 9.90 
Virginia 0.07 30325.38 0.04 178.8 3.04 0 18.23 
Washington 0.11 30615.09 0.04 88.6 1.89 0 11.40 
West Virginia 0.09 20314.77 0.02 75.1 2.3 0 16.92 
Wisconsin 0.08 27684.41 0.04 98.8 1.43 0 9.65 
Wyoming 0.12 33217.95 0.03 5.1 2.87 0 3.56 
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Table 2: State Distribution of Firms in the Sample 
*: state code (in parentheses) conforms to the National Bureau of Standards' Federal Information Processing 
Standards (FIPS) codes. Under the FIPS classification system, a unique code is assigned to every state in the United 
States and its territories. These codes are used to identify a company's principal location. 
State name* 
Number of Firms in 
the Sample State name* 
Number of Firms in 
the Sample 
Alabama (01) 40 Montana (30) 5 
Alaska (02) 2 Nebraska (31) 15 
Arizona (04) 45 Nevada (32) 33 
Arkansas (05) 21 New Hampshire (33) 19 
California (06) 616 New Jersey (34) 178 
Colorado (08) 85 New Mexico (35) 6 
Connecticut (09) 93 New York (36) 329 
Delaware (10) 14 North Carolina (37) 69 
District of Columbia (11) 12 North Dakota (38) 4 
Florida (12) 178 Ohio (39) 151 
Georgia (13) 100 Oklahoma (40) 33 
Hawaii (15) 8 Oregon (41) 47 
Idaho (16) 8 Pennsylvania (42) 196 
Illinois (17) 166 Rhode Island (44) 11 
Indiana (18) 59 South Carolina (45) 23 
Iowa (19) 25 South Dakota (46) 6 
Kansas (20) 22 Tennessee (47) 48 
Kentucky (21) 34 Texas (48) 319 
Louisiana (22) 33 Utah (49) 31 
Maine (23) 9 Vermont (50) 11 
Maryland (24) 67 Virginia (51) 79 
Massachusetts (25) 200 Washington (53) 67 
Michigan (26) 84 West Virginia (54) 7 
Minnesota (27) 127 Wisconsin (55) 58 
Mississippi (28) 11 Wyoming (56) 4 
Missouri (29) 67   
   Total Sample Size 3875 
 
 
The model outlined in chapter one proposes the following firm level determinants 
of corporate ownership concentration: firm size, firm return, volatility of firm return, and 
the controller’s risk attitude. While it is difficult to measure the risk aversion of a firm’s 
controllers, the other three variables are empirically measurable. The main sources of the 
firm level financial information are the Disclosure SEC Database and Compustat 
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Database. The Compustat Database contains a wide range of data items about a firm’s 
fundamentals such as equity size, accounting profit rate, etc., but it doesn’t report enough 
information about a firm’s ownership structure for the purpose of this study. The 
Disclosure SEC Database provides more complete coverage of ownership structure for 
public companies19. I combine the financial information from these two databases by 
matching firms’ ticker symbols.  
 
Table 3: Industry Distribution of Firms in the Sample 
 
  Number of Firms Percentage 
Financial (SIC range 
6000~6999, included) 645 16.65% 
Utility (SIC range 
4900~4999, 4600~4699) 124 3.20% 
Communication (SIC 
range 4800~4899) 71 1.83% 
Other Industries 3035 78.32% 
      
Total 3875 100% 
 
 
Only firms that are currently active and firms that have been in business for at 
least 6 years (for the purpose of calculating meaningful values of firms’ expected return 
rate and its volatility) are included in the data set. After elimination of firms that lack 
enough financial information in the databases, the data set consists of 3875 public 
companies from 51 states in a 10-year period (1992~2002).  These companies are 
classified as financial companies (including banks), utility, communication, and 
                                                 
19 To be included in the SEC database, a company must provide direct goods or services and file with SEC 
or other government agencies. 
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companies in other industries, respectively, and their primary businesses spread in 408 
distinct four-digit SICs. Table 2 and Table 3 give the country-wise and industry-wise 
distribution of companies in the data set, respectively. 
Measurements of variables are constructed in ways that are consistent with the 
model (chapter one) and with common practice in the literature. Table 4 describes the 
variables and Table 5 reports summary statistics of variables. 
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 Table 4: Variable Description and Data Sources 
 
Variable Name Variable Description 
C_5% Variable to measure ownership concentration in a firm. It is equal to the sum of the 5% shareholders' 
share of the firm's outstanding stocks. Source: SEC Database. 
C_insider Insider ownership, equal to the sum of the insiders’ (officers and directors) share of the firm’s 
outstanding stocks. Source: SEC Database. 
Dfin Financial dummy, equal to 1 if the firm is a financial firm (4-digit SIC ranges from 6000 to 6999). 
Source: Compustat Database. 
Duti Utility dummy, equal to 1 if the firm is a utility company (4 digit SIC ranges from 4600 to 4699 or 
from 4900 to 4999). Source: Compustat Database. 
Dcomm Communication dummy, equal to 1 if the firm’s primary business area is communication (4-digit SIC 
ranges from 4800 to 4899). Source: Compustat Database. 
SIZEa Primary measurement of the size of the firm, equal to the firm’s accounting common equity – total (in 
million U.S. dollars). Natural log value of 10-year average (1992~2002, if available) of the firm’s 
common equity – total is used in the regressions. Source: Compustat Database. 
SIZEb Size of the firm, measured by the firm’s common equity – tangible (in million U.S. dollars). Natural 
log value of 10-year average (1992~2002, if available) of the firm’s common equity – tangible is used 
in the regressions for robustness checks. Source: Compustat Database. 
SIZEc Size of the firm, measured by the stockholders’ equity – total (in million U.S. dollars). Natural log 
value of 10-year average (1992~2002, if available) of the stockholders’ equity – total is used in the 
regressions for robustness checks. Source: Compustat Database. 
RETURNa Primary measurement of the firm’s accounting rate of return, equal to the after-tax return on common 
equity - total. Value of 10-year average (1992~2002, if available) of the firm’s after-tax return on 
common equity - total is used in the regressions. Source: Compustat Database. 
RETURNb Accounting rate of return, measured by the firm’s after-tax return on common equity – tangible. Value 
of 10-year average (1992~2002, if available) of the firm’s after-tax return on common equity - tangible 
is used in the regressions for robustness checks. Source: Compustat Database. 
RETURNc Accounting rate of return, measured by the firm’s after-tax return on stockholder’s equity – total. 
Value of 10-year average (1992~2002, if available) of the firm’s after-tax return on stockholder’s 
equity - total is used in the regressions for robustness checks. Source: Compustat Database. 
VARa Primary measurement of the instability of the firm’s accounting rate of return, equal to the variance of 
the firm’s after-tax return on common equity – total in the past 10 years (1992~2002, if available). 
Source: Compustat Database. 
VARb Alternative measurement of the instability of the firm’s accounting rate of return, equal to the variance 
of the firm’s after-tax return on common equity – tangible in the past 10 years (1992~2002, if 
available). Source: Compustat Database. 
VARc Alternative measurement of the instability of the firm’s accounting rate of return, equal to the variance 
of the firm’s after-tax return on stockholder’s equity – total in the past 10 years (1992~2002, if 
available). Source: Compustat Database. 
CORRUPTION Federal public corruption convictions by district over 1992 – 2001, per 100,000 population (measured 
in 1996). Source: Berkowitz and Clay (2003). 
OTHER STATE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Four variables: 1. GSP: measure of the state income, equal to the 10-year average (1992~2002) of real 
gross state product (the value added in production by the labor and property located in a state, chained 
1996 dollars) per capita; 2. GROWTH: measure of the growth rate of the real gross state product 
(chained 1996 dollars) from 1992~2002; 3. Business tax: measure of a state’s business tax rate, equal 
to the 10-year average (1992~2002) of the ratio of the indirect business tax rate to the gross state 
product; 4. DENSITY: measure of the population density in a state, equal to the number of persons per 
square mile in midyear 2000. Source: Census Bureau, Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. 
commerce department. 
Civil Post-Rev. Dummy Equal to 1 if a state was originally settled by France, Spain, or Mexico, and had substantial numbers of 
land grants from these countries and was acquired subsequent to the American Revolution. Source: 
Berkowitz and Clay (2003). 
Climate Annual average temperature*Annual average humidity*Annual average precipitation*0.0001. Source: 
Berkowitz and Clay (2003). 
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Table 5: Summary Statistics of Variables 
*: indicating that the data is available in 48 states and variable statistics is state-wise. 
Variable Name Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Maximum Minimum 
Number of 
Observations 
C_5% 0.42 0.40 0.27 1.00 0 3875 
C_insider 0.13 0.05 0.18 1.00 0 3872 
SIZEa (million US$) 604.50 84.39 2251.41 48475.50 0.05 3539 
SIZEb 449.10 61.80 1773.73 48505.40 0.05 3600 
SIZEc 614.63 85.66 2275.62 48475.50 0.05 3554 
RETURNa 0.04 0.09 0.23 0.99 -1.00 3539 
RETURNb 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.99 -0.99 3273 
RETURNc 0.03 0.09 0.23 0.87 -1.00 3554 
VARa 0.27 0.01 0.91 9.99 0 3539 
VARb 0.38 0.02 1.12 9.98 0 3273 
VARc 0.24 0.01 0.83 9.98 0 3554 
Dfin 0.17 0 0.37 1 0 3875 
Duti 0.03 0 0.18 1 0 3875 
Dcomm 0.02 0 0.13 1 0 3875 
  
Law Enforcement 
    Corruption  2.74 2.62 1.52 7.06 0.41 48* 
Instruments for Law Enforcement 
    Civil Post-Rev. 0.21 0 0.41 1 0 48* 
    Climate 13.13 13 7.50 39.73 1.99 48* 
Other State Characteristics 
    Tax 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.06 48* 
    GSP 28102.47 27578.12 4398.66 39740.57 20314.77 48* 
    Growth 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.02 48* 
    Density 185.52 88.1 254.03 1134.4 5.1 48* 
 
 
I have two measurements of corporate ownership structure. The primary one, 
C_5%, measures ownership concentration in a firm. It is equal to the sum of the 5% 
owners' share of the firm's outstanding stocks, where 5% owners refer to all individuals, 
companies, banks or funds that own at least 5% of the company’s shares. Inspection of 
data reveals that corporate ownership concentration (C_5%) varies widely across firms, 
ranging from 0 to 100%. The mean value of C_5% is around 42% in the sample. In other 
words, ownership is fairly concentrated in the majority of public companies in the United 
States, a picture that is in contrast to Berle and Means (1932)’s image of dispersed 
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ownership. For the purpose of comparison, I construct another measurement of 
ownership structure: insider ownership (C_insider). It measures the interest of officers, 
directors and beneficial owners who hold at least 1000 shares in the firm. Simple 
treatment of data reveals that ownership concentration (C_5%) is only marginally 
correlated with insider ownership (C_insider), (panel A, Table 6). This suggests that the 
distinction between ownership concentration and managerial ownership is empirically 
significant. 
 
Table 6: Correlations between Variables 
 
Panel A: Correlations between firm-specific variables 
         
 C_5% C_insider SIZEa SIZEb SIZEc RETURNa RETURNb RETURNc 
C_5% 1        
C_insider 0.3 1       
SIZEa   1      
SIZEb   0.91 1     
SIZEc   0.99 0.91 1    
RETURNa      1   
RETURNb      0.1 1  
RETURNc      0.83 0.13 1 
        
Panel B: Correlations between state-specific variables    
         
 Corruption 
Civil 
Post-Rev. Climate GSP Growth 
Business 
Tax 
Population 
Density 
Corruption 1       
Civil Post-Rev. 0.25 1      
Climate 0.31 0.32 1     
GSP -0.17   1    
Growth -0.4   0.17 1   
Business Tax 0.3   -0.09 -0.25 1  
Population Density 0.08   0.53 -0.17 -0.07 1 
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Estimation results may be sensitive to how the firm level economic fundamentals 
are measured. For example, Himmelberg et al. (1999) suggest that the tangibility of a 
firm’s equity may have an impact on the agency cost and, subsequently, affect the firm’s 
ownership structure. To control for the possible impact of variable measurements, I 
construct alternative measurements for each of the firm level determinants. I have three 
measurements of firm size: SIZEa (primary measurement), SIZEb, and SIZEc. They take 
the value of the firm’s common equity – total, common equity – tangible, and the 
stockholder’s equity – total, respectively.  Natural log value of 10-year (annually from 
1992 to 2002, if available) average of these variables is used in regressions. Some 
companies report negative equity value. These “outliers” are excluded from the 
regressions. Not surprisingly, the correlations between these alternative measurements 
are high (panel A, Table 6). The coefficient on this variable is expected to have a 
negative sign. 
I construct three measurements of a firm’s accounting profit rate, corresponding 
to the three measurements of firm size: RETURNa (primary measurement), RETURNb, 
and RETURNc. They are calculated as the firm’s after-tax return on common equity – 
total, on common equity – tangible, and on stockholder’s equity – total, respectively. 
Value of 10-year average (1992~2002, if available) of the accounting profit rate (annual) 
is used in regressions. Firms whose average accounting profit rate is beyond (-100%, 
+100%) are treated as “outliers” and are deleted from the regressions since these firms 
were likely involved in some special event (for example, merger, acquisition, change of 
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accounting rules, etc.) during the past 10 years.  The sign of the coefficient on this 
variable is predicted to be positive by the model (chapter one). 
Measurements of the instability of a firm’s accounting profit rate are constructed 
in similar ways. VARa (primary measurement), VARb, and VARc give the variance of 
the firm’s after-tax return on common equity – total, on common equity – tangible, and 
on stockholder’s equity – total in the past 10 years (if available), respectively. Some 
companies’ financial reports show exceptionally high volatility in their accounting profit 
rate (greater or equal to 10) and these companies are treated as outliers and are excluded 
from the regressions20. 
Previous studies on the determinants of corporate ownership concentration 
document significant industry effects. For example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) report that 
in regulated industries such as utility and financial industry, ownership concentration 
tends to be low21. To account for possible industry effects, I construct three industry 
dummy variables – Dfin, Duti, Dcomm – to indicate whether a company is in the 
financial, utility or communication industries. These three industries are often believed to 
be under special regulations at the federal or state level. 
Expression (24) gives the primary reduced-form estimation model. Quadratic 
forms of variables are included in regressions to take care of possible nonlinearities. In 
addition to this primary model, various model specifications and variable measurements 
are tested for the purpose of robustness checks. 
                                                 
20 The regression results are not sensitive to this cut-off. 
21 This result is consistent with equation (14) in chapter one. Special regulatory rules in some industries 
provide extra protection on investor rights (low value of p in relative to other industries). This results in 
relatively low ownership concentration in firms of these industries. 
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(24) 
β s: coefficients to be estimated; 
SQU_~: quadratic form of variables; 
OTHERS: other state characteristics (GSP, Tax, Growth, and Density); 
Subscript i : state index, from 1 to 48; 
Subscript : firm index, from 1 to up to 616; j
ε :  i.i.d. error term, taking care of all other unexplained variables. 
 
3.3. OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Table 7 reports the OLS regression results with different model specifications. All 
regressions correct for possible correlation of the errors at the state level (clusters). The 
dependent variable is ownership concentration (C_5%). The relation between ownership 
concentration and the effectiveness of law enforcement is clearly negative (regressions 
(1) to (3) in Table 7). The coefficient on corruption is positive and highly significant (5% 
significance level). This result is not sensitive to the use of the 10-year sub-sample which 
contains firms with at least 10 years’ financial information in the databases (regressions 
(5) and (6) in Table 7). Since natural log value of this variable is used in regressions, the 
estimation result can be explained as follows: if the legal environment of a state is 1% 
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more corruptive, this will result in 0.02~0.03 percentage point increase in ownership 
concentration. 
 
Table 7: OLS Regression Analysis 
Note: columns (1) ~ (4) report regression results using the full sample; columns (5) & (6) present the regression results using the 10-
year sub-sample (companies that have at least 10-year financial reports in COMPUSTAT); dependent variable is C_5%; standard 
errors (in parentheses) adjust for heteroscedasticity; natural log values of SIZE, Corruption, GSP, and Density are used in regressions; 
E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power; *** indicates a significance level of 1%; ** indicates a significance level of 
5%; * indicates a significance level of 10%. 
Regressions Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.59** 
(0.47) 
-3.20*** 
(0.60) 
-2.59*** 
(0.35) 
-2.53*** 
(0.35) 
0.72 
(0.60) 
-3.58*** 
(0.76) 
Dfin -0.13*** 
(0.01) 
-0.13*** 
(0.01) 
-0.14*** 
(0.01) 
-0.14*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
Duti -0.25*** 
(0.02) 
-0.24*** 
(0.02) 
-0.24*** 
(0.02) 
-0.24*** 
(0.02) 
-0.24*** 
(0.02) 
-0.23*** 
(0.03) 
Dcomm -0.01 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04)  
-0.04 
(0.06) 
0.40E-02 
(0.06) 
SIZEa -0.02*** 
(0.26E-02) 
0.35*** 
(0.04) 
0.35*** 
(0.04) 
0.34*** 
(0.04) 
-0.03*** 
(0.32E-02) 
0.38*** 
(0.04) 
SQUSIZEa 
 
-0.01*** 
(0.97E-03) 
-0.01*** 
(0.96E-03) 
-0.01*** 
(0.96E-03)  
-0.01*** 
(0.12E-02) 
RETRUNa 0.11*** 
(0.02) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.16*** 
(0.03) 
0.14*** 
(0.03) 
SQURETa 
 
-0.13*** 
(0.05)  
-0.13*** 
(0.05)   
VARa -0.01* 
(0.56E-02) 
0.47E-02 
(0.64E-02) 
-0.39E-02 
(0.55E-02) 
0.55E-02 
(0.65E-02) 
-0.01 
(0.73E-02) 
-0.32E-02 
(0.74E-02) 
Corruption 0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.84E-02)  
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
Other State Characteristics INCLUDED INCLUDED 
NOT 
INCLUDED 
NOT 
INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
        
R-square 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.14 
F test 30.82 36.30 56.97 65.33 21.49 27.93 
Observation 3539 3539 3539 3539 2144 2144 
 
Firm size has a negative overall effect on ownership concentration, and strong 
nonlinearity is detected once quadratic form of this variable is included in the regressions 
(regressions (1) ~ (4) in Table 7). The turning point between a positive and negative 
relation is around 17~17.5 (natural log value), which corresponds to 24~40 million US$. 
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Compare this to the sample mean (604.50 million) and it seems to suggest that the 
negative relation between firm size and ownership concentration is more likely to exist 
for large firms rather than small firms. This result persists with the exclusion of state-
specific variables (regression (4) in Table 7) and is not sensitive to the use of the 10-year 
sub-sample (regressions (5) and (6) in Table 7). 
Similar to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), strong industry effects are detected in this 
OLS regression analysis. The coefficients on the financial dummy and utility dummy are 
negative and significant (both at 1% level). This suggests that, compared to firms in other 
industries, financial companies and utility companies have low ownership concentration 
after controlling for other factors that affect ownership concentration. On average, 
corporate ownership concentration in the financial industry is 6%~14% lower than that in 
other industries, and ownership concentration in utility companies is about 23%~25% 
lower. The coefficient estimate on the communication dummy is empirically 
insignificant, which may reflect the course of deregulation that has been going on in this 
industry. 
Coefficient estimate on firm’s accounting profit rate shows a positive relation 
with ownership concentration and this relation is highly significant (at 1% level). This 
finding is consistent with my model prediction and is in contrast to Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985)’s result. Strong nonlinearity is detected when including the quadratic form of this 
variable in the regressions. Both the significance level and the magnitude of the 
coefficient estimate change very little with the exclusion of state-specific variables 
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(regression (4) in Table 7) or with the use of the 10-year sub-sample (regressions (5) and 
(6) in Table 7). 
Coefficient estimate on the volatility of firm’s profit rate is negative as expected, 
but is empirically insignificant (except regression (5) with the 10-year sub-sample in 
Table 7). In addition, the sign of coefficient estimate is sensitive to the inclusion of the 
quadratic form of the accounting profit rate. While this result neither supports nor 
contradicts my model prediction, it suggests that the correlation between firm return and 
its risk could be an important factor that affects the estimation results. Since my model 
doesn’t elaborate on this correlation, I am reluctant to speculate on any model 
specification that takes account of this issue, and will just leave it for future work. 
Regressions with insider ownership (C_insider) as the dependent variable yield 
empirically insignificant coefficient estimates (Table 8). No significant relation between 
managerial ownership and law enforcement is detected. This result is in clear contrast to 
that of Himmelberg et al. (2001). Doubt is cast on the practice in previous work that uses 
the term “ownership concentration” and the term “managerial ownership” 
interchangeably. This empirical finding confirms the proposition that for the purpose of 
revealing the governance arrangement in a firm, it is the ownership concentration rather 
than the managerial ownership or insider ownership that is relevant. 
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Table 8: OLS Regression Analysis: Insider Ownership 
Note: standard errors (in parentheses) adjust for heteroscedasticity; natural log values of SIZE, Corruption, 
GSP, and Density are used in regressions; E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power; *** indicates 
a significance level of 1%; ** indicates a significance level of 5%; * indicates a significance level of 10%. 
Dependent Variable: Insider Ownership (C_insider) 
 
  
Variables 
  (1) (2) 
Constant 0.45 
(0.32) 
0.74* 
(0.43) 
Dfin -0.13E-03 
(0.80E-02) 
-0.11E-03 
(0.80E-02) 
Duti -0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
Dcomm 0.04 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
SIZEa -0.03*** 
(0.17E-02) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
SQUSIZEa 
 
0.73E-03 
(0.71E-03) 
RETRUNa 0.05*** 
(0.02) 
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
SQURETa 
 
0.71E-02 
(0.04) 
VARa -0.87E-03 
(0.37E-02) 
-0.18E-02 
(0.39E-02) 
Corruption -0.71E-02 
(0.79E-02) 
-0.70E-02 
(0.79E-02) 
Other State Characteristics INCLUDED INCLUDED 
    
R-square 0.08 0.08 
F test 28.83 24.50 
Observation 3539 3539 
 
In general, OLS estimation results show high consistency with the model 
predictions (chapter one). The firm-level economic variables specified as determinants of 
ownership concentration by the model all have the predicted relations with ownership 
concentration and most of these relations are found to be empirically significant. After 
controlling for the firm-level determinants, corporate ownership concentration varies 
systematically with the effectiveness of law enforcement across states. The positive 
relation between corporate ownership concentration and public corruption is empirically 
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significant. The overall estimation model is highly significant, too. These results are 
robust with the inclusion of other state characteristics and with the use of the 10-year sub-
sample. Some of the OLS results resemble existing findings in the literature (for example, 
the negative relation between C_5% and SIZE and the strong industrial effect as 
documented by Demsetz and Lehn (1985)), while others differ from past work. 
 
3.4. IV Estimation 
 
Until this point, the quality of law enforcement in a state has been treated as being 
exogenous both in the model and in the regressions. However, the possibility that the 
effectiveness of legal system is endogenous itself has been well recognized in the 
literature. For example, one recent working paper by Laeven and Woodruff (2003) 
proposes that larger firms may demand a better legal system. It may also be true that 
when corporate ownership spreads in a larger group of investors, there is greater demand 
for more protective law enforcement. Thus dispersed ownership may be one important 
factor that causes a strong legal system to come forward in the first place. Such 
endogeneity problem may bias the OLS estimator and make it inconsistent. 
To tackle this possible endogeneity problem, I construct instrumental variables 
and implement IV procedure to estimate the coefficients of interest. Since the potential 
endogeneity problem involves the variables measuring law enforcement in a state, I focus 
on instrumenting for CORRUPTION, i.e. to find variables that are substantially 
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correlated to this variable and are believed to be unrelated to other variables included in 
the regressions. One recent study by Berkowitz and Clay (2003) provides a number of 
candidates for this purpose. Berkowitz and Clay (2003) find that the initial legal system 
and the initial climate environment in a state have persistent effect on the quality of 
contemporary institutions. For example, states that were originally settled by Great 
Britain – a common law country – have better contemporary institutions than states that 
were originally settled by France, Spain, Mexico, and Netherlands – all civil law 
countries. Also, contemporary institutions in a state are found to be highly correlated with 
the initial climate environment of that state. Meanwhile, there is no obvious reason to 
believe that these initial conditions are in any way correlated with corporate ownership 
concentration or other firm level fundamentals at present. Following these leads, I use 
two variables that indicate the initial legal environment and initial climate environment as 
instruments for the contemporary quality of law enforcement in a state: Civil Post-Rev. 
dummy, equal to 1 if a state was originally settled by France, Spain, or Mexico, and had 
substantial numbers of land grants from these countries and was acquired subsequent to 
the American Revolution; Climate variable, equal to the product of annual average 
temperature, annual average humidity, and annual average precipitation (divided by 
10,000). Data about these two variables are taken directly from Berkowitz and Clay 
(2003). The correlations between these variables are reported in panel B of Table 6. 
I use a standard 2SLS procedure to carry out the IV estimation. The results of IV 
regressions are reported in Table 9. All regressions correct for possible correlation of the 
errors at the state level (clusters). 
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Table 9: IV Estimation 
Note: panel A reports the second-stage results of the 2SLS estimation and Panel B reports the first-stage results with Corruption as the 
dependent variable; Column (1) and column (2) report estimation results using climate variable as instrument for Corruption; Column 
(3) presents the estimation results using the Civil Post-Revo dummy variable that indicate the initial legal environment in a state as 
instrument; standard errors (in parentheses) adjust for heteroscedasticity; natural log values of SIZE, Corruption, GSP, and Density are 
used in regressions; E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power; *** indicates a significance level of 1%; ** indicates a 
significance level of 5%; * indicates a significance level of 10%. 
  Panel A: Second Stage Dependent Variable: C_5% 
Variables (1) (2) (1) 
Constant 0.21 
(0.62) 
-3.65*** 
(0.71) 
0.69 
(0.49) 
Dfin -0.14*** 
(0.01) 
-0.14*** 
(0.01) 
-0.13*** 
(0.01) 
Duti -0.25*** 
(0.02) 
-0.24*** 
(0.02) 
-0.25*** 
(0.02) 
Dcomm -0.01 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
SIZEa -0.02*** 
(0.30E-02) 
0.35*** 
(0.04) 
-0.02*** 
(0.27E-02) 
SQUSIZEa 
 
-0.01*** 
(0.98E-03)  
RETRUNa 0.11*** 
(0.02) 
0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
SQURETa 
 
-0.11** 
(0.05)  
VARa -0.01** 
(0.56E-02) 
0.23E-02 
(0.65E-02) 
-0.01* 
(0.56E-02) 
Corruption 0.11 
(0.08) 
0.13 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
Other State Characteristics INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
 Panel B: First Stage Dependent Variable: Corruption  
Climate 0.01*** (0.13E-02) 
0.01*** 
(0.13E-02)  
Civil Post-Revo. Dummy   
0.28*** 
(0.01) 
Other State Characteristics    
        Tax 10.52*** (0.52) 
10.54*** 
(0.52) 
9.96*** 
(0.45) 
        GSP -0.15 (0.09) 
-0.14 
(0.09) 
-0.31*** 
(0.07) 
        Growth -17.90*** (1.06) 
-17.88*** 
(1.06) 
-20.38*** 
(1.04) 
        Density 0.19*** (0.02) 
0.19*** 
(0.02) 
0.23*** 
(0.01) 
Adjusted R-square 0.45 0.45 0.49 
 
Panel A of Table 9 reports the second-stage results of the 2SLS estimation and 
Panel B reports the first-stage results with Corruption as the dependent variable. Column 
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(1) and column (2) present results using initial climate environment as instrument for 
Corruption, and column (3) reports coefficient estimates using the initial legal condition 
(Civil Post-Rev. dummy) as instrument. In general, 2SLS estimation results highly 
resemble the OLS results as reported in Table 7. All the coefficient estimates retain their 
signs as in OLS regressions. Coefficient estimates on firm level fundamentals and 
industry dummies are very close to the OLS estimates. Interestingly, the coefficient 
estimates on law enforcement are generally bigger in IV estimation than in OLS 
estimation (Table 9). This seems to suggest that the real effect of law enforcement on 
corporate ownership concentration is bigger than that shown in OLS regressions once the 
potential endogeneity problem is accounted for. 
 
3.5. Robustness Checks 
 
The empirical results reported above are robust across different model 
specifications and estimation procedures (Table 7-9). For example, the relation between 
ownership concentration and the set of firm-specific variables, and the relation between 
ownership concentration and state-level law enforcement remain significant with the 
inclusion of other state characteristics. The observed relations persist when using the 10-
year sub-sample which includes only firms that have at least 10 years’ financial reports in 
the databases. These results change very little when instrumenting for the effectiveness of 
law enforcement in regressions. 
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How are the firm-level fundamentals measured may matter to the estimation 
results. To account for this concern, I replicate the OLS regression analysis using 
alternative measurements for firm size, accounting profit rate and its volatility. Table 10 
reports the results for robustness checks using these alternative variable measurements. 
 
Table 10: Robustness Checks 
Note: dependent variable is C_5%; standard errors (in parentheses) adjust for heteroscedasticity; natural log values of SIZE, 
Corruption, GSP, and Density are used in regressions; E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power; *** indicates a 
significance level of 1%; ** indicates a significance level of 5%; * indicates a significance level of 10%. 
Variables Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.45 
(0.49) 
-2.53*** 
(0.62) 
0.65 
(0.47) 
-2.96*** 
(0.61) 
Dfin -0.13*** 
(0.01) 
-0.13*** 
(0.01) 
-0.13*** 
(0.01) 
-0.13*** 
(0.01) 
Duti -0.24*** 
(0.02) 
-0.23*** 
(0.02) 
-0.24*** 
(0.02) 
-0.23*** 
(0.02) 
Dcomm -0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.47E-02 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
SIZEb -0.02*** 
(0.27E-02) 
0.27*** 
(0.04)   
SQUSIZEb 
 
-0.80E-02*** 
(0.10E-02)   
RETRUNb 0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.05*** 
(0.02)   
SQURETb 
 
-0.13*** 
(0.04)   
VARb -0.01*** 
(0.46E-02) 
-0.59E-03 
(0.61E-02)   
SIZEc 
  
-0.02*** 
(0.27E-02) 
0.34*** 
(0.04) 
SQUSIZEc 
   
-0.01*** 
(0.10E-02) 
RETURNc 
  
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
0.07*** 
(0.03) 
SQURETc 
   
-0.14*** 
(0.05) 
VARc 
  
-0.01* 
(0.64E-02) 
0.21E-02 
(0.73E-02) 
Corruption 0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
Other State Characteristics INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
      
R-square 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.12 
F test 28.70 31.30 31.15 36.21 
Observation 3273 3273 3554 3554 
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In general, the OLS and IV estimation results reported in previous section are 
robust. Coefficient estimates on Corruption and industry dummies are insensitive to 
alternative measurements for the firm level fundamentals. All other coefficient estimates 
retain their signs and level of significance. The overall model remains to be highly 
significant. 
 
3.6. Conclusions 
 
Empirical assessment in this chapter generates results that are highly consistent 
with the model’s predictions (chapter one). Using a data set of 3875 public companies 
from 51 states in the U.S., I study the determinants of corporate ownership concentration 
with an estimation structure suggested by the model. I find that corporate ownership 
concentration is negatively related to firm size, positively related to firm’s accounting 
profit rate, and negatively related to the instability of accounting profit rate. These 
relations are statistically significant. Strong industry effects are detected. After 
controlling for these firm-level determinants, ownership concentration varies 
systematically with the effectiveness of law enforcement across states in ways that are 
consistent with the model predictions. These findings persist when I instrument for the 
effectiveness of law enforcement with initial legal systems and initial climate 
environment in a state. Furthermore, these results are robust across different model 
specifications and variable measurements. 
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This study suggests several directions for future research. First, my results call for 
closer examination of the composition of controllers in a firm. What types of investors 
control the firm may have important implications on the firm’s governance arrangement 
and on the controllers’ tunneling behavior. For example, there has been debate on what 
role is played by institutional investors in a firm’s governance arrangement. One 
interesting feature about institutional investors that has been often overlooked in the 
literature is that they act less risk-aversely than other big shareholders due to the fact that 
they can effectively diversify their investments. Therefore, if institutional owners are 
indeed active in corporate governance, my model will suggest that the growing influence 
of institutional investors plays a positive role in constraining tunneling. Such questions 
merit more careful investigation in the future. 
Second, in this paper I only examined the economic impact of legal institutions in 
a firm’s environment. When heterogeneous institutions, different cultures and various 
levels of development are taken into consideration, investor protection may come from 
various sources other than formal legal institutions. For example, family value and 
entrepreneur’s concern about his/her reputation may be important factors in constraining 
tunneling in some countries. Such concerns may even induce entrepreneurs to use their 
own money to benefit minority shareholders as compensation to the weak legal systems 
in some developing countries (Friedman et al. (2003)). How do these factors affect the 
cost function of tunneling? Are they empirically measurable and important? More 
theoretical and empirical work is needed along this line. 
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4.  What Determines Corporate Ownership Concentration around 
the World?22 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter extends Demsetz and Lehn (1985)’s results and studies the 
determinants of corporate ownership concentration across countries using a newly 
constructed data set of 1070 publicly traded stock companies from 45 countries. OLS and 
IV estimation results show that corporate ownership concentration varies systematically 
with respect to certain firm-specific economic variables and country characteristics in 
ways that are consistent with both value maximization and predictions of agency theory. 
For example, it is found in this chapter that after controlling for firm-level determinants 
such as firm size, auditing practice, return rate, etc, corporate ownership concentration is 
significantly lower in countries with more developed stock market and more effective 
investor protection. These results provide strong evidence in support of the model in 
chapter one and are consistent with La Porta et al. (1999)’s idea that ownership 
concentration is a substitute for legal institutions as a mechanism to protect investor 
rights. These findings are robust across different model specifications and variable 
measurements. 
 
4.1. Introduction and Related Research 
 
Ownership structure is a primary element in determining governance 
arrangements in a firm. Corporations can have concentrated ownership by active owners 
or dispersed ownership through domestic and international markets. In some countries 
like the US and UK, firms with dispersed ownership structure are more common than in 
other countries. Why does the ownership structure differ across firms and across 
                                                 
22 This paper is forthcoming on Advances in Financial Economics, Volume 9 (2004). 
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countries? What are the key elements that determine corporate ownership concentration? 
These are the questions that this paper attempts to answer. 
It has been argued since Demsetz and Lehn (1985) that ownership concentration 
in a firm is endogenous depending on various firm-specific variables such as firm size, 
instability of the firm’s accounting profit rate, and whether or not the firm is in certain 
industries. They propose that the structure of corporate ownership varies systematically in 
ways that are consistent with value maximization. However, another study by 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) argues that managerial ownership is explained by key variables 
in the contracting environment in ways consistent with the predictions of principal-agent 
models. There has been no consensus in the literature on how ownership structure is 
endogenized in a firm. 
A recent working paper by Qu (2004b) proposes another explanation about the 
endogeneity of corporate ownership concentration. In that paper, a model based on 
agency theory is developed to study tunneling behavior, defined as the transfer of assets 
and profits out of a firm for the benefit of its controlling shareholders (controllers). Qu 
(2004b) argues that ownership concentration is determined as investors try to maximize 
the expected firm value by minimizing the level of tunneling. In this context, corporate 
ownership concentration is endogenized in ways that are consistent with both value 
maximization and the agency theory. 
In light of this new development of theory, the present study investigates 
empirically the determinants of corporate ownership concentration around the world. I 
first develop hypotheses about the determinants of corporate ownership concentration 
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that are consistent with Qu (2004b)’s model and argue that different forms of ownership 
are adapted to various firm-specific variables and certain country-specific variables. I 
then examine the conjectures about the impact of these two groups of variables on 
corporate ownership concentration empirically using a newly constructed dataset of 1070 
publicly traded stock companies from 45 countries around the world. 
Empirical findings in this paper generally confirm Qu (2004b)’s model 
predictions. OLS and IV estimations find statistically significant relations between 
ownership concentration and various firm-specific economic variables including firm 
size, the accounting profit rate, the volatility of the profit rate, the firm’s auditing 
practice, which industry the firm is in, and whether or not preferred stocks are issued 
extensively. After controlling for these firm-level determinants, the estimation results 
strongly support the hypothesis that corporate ownership concentration varies 
systematically across countries depending on certain country characteristics, among 
which the development of stock market and the effectiveness of legal protection on 
investor rights are important ones. Specifically, it is found in this paper that ceteris 
paribus, firms are less (more) likely to have high ownership concentration in countries 
that have more (less) advanced stock markets or provide more (less) effective investor 
protection. These results are consistent with La Porta et al. (1999)’s idea that ownership 
concentration is a substitute for legal institutions as a mechanism to protect investor 
rights. 
The current study differs from past work in a number of ways. Unlike the studies 
that try to explain managerial ownership (such as, Himmelberg et al. (1999), (2001)), in 
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this paper, I argue that it is critical to make a distinction between ownership 
concentration and managerial ownership. Ownership concentration measures how a 
firm’s ownership is concentrated on its big shareholders, while managerial ownership is 
only an indictor of the interests of a potential subset of the controllers (the firm’s officers 
and directors). Since big shareholders either participate in the management directly or 
provide significant monitoring to the management, ownership concentration is a better 
indictor of the firm controllers’ interest in the firm than managerial ownership23. 
Therefore, for the purpose of revealing a firm’s governance structure, ownership 
concentration is more relevant than managerial ownership24. From this perspective, this 
paper follows the vein of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and attempts to explain corporate 
ownership concentration rather than managerial ownership. 
On the basis of Demsetz and Lehn (1985)’s results, this paper expands the 
conventional wisdom about the determinants of corporate ownership concentration within 
one country to the multi-country context with country characteristics being accounted for. 
Some of the findings in this paper are consistent with Demsetz and Lehn (1985)’s results. 
For example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find that ownership concentration is relatively 
low in firms with large size using a sample of 511 big U.S. corporations. Similar relation 
is also detected using the newly collected international dataset. Some of the findings in 
this paper are in contrast to Demsetz and Lehn (1985)’s results. For instance, the 
                                                 
23 For more discussion about the role of large shareholders in corporate governance, refer to Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986), Agrawal and Mandelker (1990), and Demsetz (1983). 
24 The empirical results in this paper provide evidence in support of this argument. For example, ownership 
concentration is found to be negatively correlated with managerial ownership in the sample of 1070 public 
companies from 45 countries. 
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accounting rate of return is found to be positively related to ownership concentration, and 
the instability of the profit rate has a negative relation with ownership concentration, 
while Demsetz and Lehn (1985) report the opposite.  In addition, I take advantage of the 
newly available data sources since Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and study a number of firm-
level and country-level determinants that are not examined in Demsetz and Lehn (1985)’s 
regression analysis. For example, this paper documents a significant positive relation 
between the ratio of preferred stocks in total capital and ownership concentration. It also 
investigates the relation between corporate ownership concentration and certain country 
characteristics such as the development of its stock market and how effectively investors’ 
rights are being protected in a country.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Part 4.2 develops hypotheses about 
the determinants of corporate ownership concentration in light of Qu (2004b)’s 
theoretical findings. Part 4.3 describes the variables included in the regression analysis 
and the sources of data. Part 4.4 reports the main estimation results. Part 4.5 checks the 
robustness of the main results, and part 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2. Determinants of Corporate Ownership Concentration 
 
 A recent working paper by Qu (2004b) argues that corporate ownership 
concentration is endogenized in ways that are consistent with both value maximization 
(Demsetz and Lehn (1985)) and predictions of the agency theory (Himmelberg et al. 
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(1999)). Ownership concentration on the firm’s controllers has two basic effects. One 
effect is that the controllers’ interests are now aligned to the firm value and this makes 
the controllers’ interests consistent with other investors’. This effect is named the 
alignment effect by Qu (2004b). While alignment effect helps to protect investors from 
agency problem, the other effect, called risk-aversion effect, works on the opposite 
direction. To maintain a controlling stake of the firm’s equity, the controllers’ wealth is 
not as diversified as other investors’ and the controllers have to bear higher risk related to 
the firm. This makes the firm controllers more risk-averse than other investors. Due to 
this risk-averseness, the controllers may engage in tunneling25 just trying to obtain a risk 
premium. From this perspective, ownership concentration on the firm’s controllers 
provides an incentive for them to tunnel from the minority shareholders and makes the 
controllers’ interests distant from other investors’. Both effects increase with ownership 
concentration. Since the risk-aversion effect grows faster than the alignment effect as 
ownership concentration rises, there is an optimal ownership concentration that equates 
the marginal alignment effect and the marginal risk-aversion effect, and consequently, 
maximizes the expected firm value by minimizing tunneling. 
The existence of the financial assets market ensures that the optimal ownership 
concentration is the equilibrium outcome as the result of the interactions between the firm 
controllers and the large group of small shareholders in the market. Whenever a firm’s 
ownership concentration deviates from its optimal level so that the firm’s expected value 
is not maximized, there is a chance for other investors to buy out the firm and make a 
                                                 
25 Tunneling is defined as the transfer of assets and profits out of the firm for the benefit of the firm’s 
controllers.  For more discussion about tunneling behavior, refer to Johnson et al. (2000) and Qu (2004b). 
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profit through the increased financial assets value of the firm. In other words, assuming 
that the financial market is efficient and such chances to make money through financial 
transactions are exhausted, corporate ownership concentration in equilibrium is at its 
optimal level. Therefore, the endogeneity of ownership concentration is consistent with 
value maximization, as well as the agency theory. Further detail about the model can be 
found in Qu (2004b). 
The above discussion suggests a general rule to identify the determinants of 
corporate ownership concentration: any variable that affects the marginal alignment 
effect and/or the marginal risk-aversion effect will have an impact on corporate 
ownership concentration. In this paper, these variables are categorized into two groups: 
firm-specific variables and country-specific variables. Their expected relations to 
corporate ownership concentration will be discussed separately as follows. 
 
4.2.1. Firm-level Determinants 
 
 Qu (2004b) proposes the following variables on the firm level that will possibly 
affect a firm’s ownership concentration: firm size, rate of return, instability of the rate of 
return, and the controller’s risk attitude. While it is difficult to measure a person’s risk 
attitude empirically, the other three variables are measurable. 
Size of the firm. Big size makes it difficult for the controller to maintain a 
controlling stake of the firm and thus his/her wealth has to be considerably entrenched in 
the firm. Therefore, as firm size increases, the marginal risk-aversion effect increases in 
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relative to the marginal alignment effect (in Figure 2, MRE  curve shifts upward). This 
lowers the equilibrium ownership concentration. In other words, there exists a negative 
relation between firm size and ownership concentration.  
Firm’s rate of return. Higher profit rate makes it more effective to align the 
controller’s interest to the firm by ownership stake. The marginal alignment effect 
increases ( MAE curve shifts upward in Figure 2), which results in a higher ownership 
concentration. Therefore, a positive relation between these two variables is expected. 
Previous studies on this relation yield mixed results (see, Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
Himmelberg et al. (1999), among others). 
Instability of the firm’s rate of return. As the instability of a firm’s rate of return 
increases, the marginal risk-aversion effect becomes stronger in relative to the marginal 
alignment effect ( MRE  curve shifts upward in relative to MAE  curve in Figure 2). As a 
result, the equilibrium ownership concentration decreases. I will test whether the 
expected negative relation does exist in this empirical study. Past work again generates 
mixed results (for example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) document a positive relation, but 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) report a negative relation). 
In addition, there are some other firm-specific variables that seem to be important 
enough to merit investigation in light of Qu (2004b)’s model: 
Firm-level investor protection. Investor protection should be interpreted as a 
parameter that varies not only across countries, but also across firms, as proposed by 
Himmelberg et al. (2001). For example, in firms under better auditing, controllers are 
better monitored, and the need to align the controllers’ interest becomes less important 
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( MAE  curve shifts downward in relative to MRE  curve in Figure 2). This suggests a 
negative relation between the quality of the firm’s auditing and ownership concentration. 
However, such argument is only valid under the assumption that the firm’s auditing 
practice is an exogenous variable. The alternative assumption would be that the auditing 
practice in a firm, like the corporate ownership concentration, is a choice variable as 
investors try to maximize the firm value. Under this alternative assumption, a positive 
relation between these two variables is likely to exist. I will assess these two different 
hypotheses in this study. 
Industry fixed effects. In regulated industries such as utility and financial industry, 
the existence of special regulatory rules could provide extra protection on investor rights 
compared to other industries. For firms in these industries, the need to align the 
controllers’ interests becomes relatively unimportant ( MAE  curve shifts downward in 
relative to MRE  curve in Figure 2). Therefore, corporate ownership concentration is 
relatively low in industries with special regulatory rules. Past work suggests several such 
industries. For example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find that in regulated utility and 
financial industries of the U.S., ownership concentration tends to be low. In this paper, a 
cross-country sample is used to test the existence of industry fixed effects on ownership 
concentration. 
Different forms of stock ownership. Although not very common in the U.S., 
preferred stocks are issued to investors as an alternative to common stocks in some firms. 
The issuance of preferred stocks usually allows big holders of a firm’s common stocks to 
maintain their control over the firm. If preferred stock is a significant source of a firm’s 
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capital, ownership concentration within the group of common stockholders is likely to be 
high. 
Cost of debt financing. It has been proposed in the literature that if debt financing 
is less costly for a firm, the firm may rely less on equity financing and more on debt 
financing. As a result, the firm’s ownership may be less diversified and the controller 
may hold a higher stake of the firm’s equity. This hypothesis of negative relation between 
these two variables will be tested in this paper. 
 
4.2.2. Country-level Determinants 
 
Certain country-specific variables that characterize the environment outside a firm 
have great impacts on the governance arrangements within the firm, as reflected by its 
ownership concentration. Understandably, one can give a long list of such variables. In 
light of Qu (2004b)’s model, I focus on two aspects of a firm’s environment in this study: 
the legal environment, and the development of stock market. 
Legal environment. It has been argued since La Porta et al. (1997) that legal 
protection on investor rights varies significantly across countries. For example, English 
common law countries are generally believed to provide more effective investor 
protection than French civil law countries. If the legal institutions in a firm’s environment 
protect investor rights well, the need to align the controllers’ interests through ownership 
arrangement becomes relatively unimportant (the MAE curve shifts downward in relative 
to MRE  curve in Figure 2). This implies a negative relation between ownership 
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concentration and the effectiveness of legal protection on investor rights in a country. 
Another way to derive this hypothesis is that since legal protection on investor rights and 
ownership concentration are two alternative ways to protect investors from agency 
problem, the relation between these two variables is negative. This study will test 
whether legal protection on investor rights is an empirically significant explanatory 
variable of ownership concentration in firms around the world, and whether this relation 
is negative as expected. 
Development of the stock market. The disciplinary role played by the financial 
market in the area of corporate governance has long been recognized in the literature. A 
well-developed stock market is important for the corporate ownership concentration to be 
optimized. It keeps investors well informed and increases ownership diversification. 
Therefore, firms in a country with well developed stock market are likely to have low 
ownership concentration, i.e., a negative relation between these two variables is expected. 
Equation (25) gives the primary reduced-form estimation model used in this 
study. Quadratic forms of variables are included to take care of possible nonlinearities. In 
addition to this primary model, various alternative model specifications and variable 
measurements are tested in the IV estimation and robustness checks. 
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(25) 
β s: coefficients to be estimated; 
C5: measure of corporate ownership concentration; 
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Duti: dummy variable for utility industry; 
Dbank: dummy variable for banking sector; 
SIZE: firm size; 
RETURN: the firm’s expected rate of return; 
STDEV: instability of the firm’s rate of return; 
AUDIT: firm’s auditing practice; 
PRE/CAP: ratio of preferred stocks in the firm’s total capital; 
LAW_BOOK: quality of laws on book to protect investor rights; 
LEGALITY: effectiveness of law enforcement; 
ADE_STOCK: adequacy of stock market; 
SQU_~: quadratic form of variables; 
Subscript i : country index, from 1 to 45; 
Subscript : firm index, from 1 to up to 30; j
ε :  i.i.d. error term, taking care of all other unexplained variables. 
 
4.3. Data and Measurements 
 
This empirical study is based on a newly constructed dataset that includes 1070 
publicly traded stock companies from 45 countries (regions) in a 10-year period 
(1992~2002). Almost every major economy in the world (excluding mainland China26, 
Russia and other transitional economies27) is sampled in the data set. Table 11 gives the 
sample distribution across countries. 
 
                                                 
26 Mainland China is excluded from the data set due to its special economic and legal institutions. 
27 Russia and other transitional economies, such as former socialist Eastern-European countries, are 
excluded from the data set due to the massive change in these countries’ legal institutions during the past 
decade. 
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Table 11: Sample Distribution and Country Specific Variables 
Country/Region Name 
Number of Firms in 
the Sample 
Adequacy of Financing 
Through Stock Market 
Quality of Laws 
on Book Legality 
ARGENTINA 7 2.78 4 12.34 
AUSTRALIA 27 7.96 4 20.44 
AUSTRIA 30 5.27 2 20.76 
BELGIUM 30 6.55 0 20.82 
BRAZIL 30 4.34 3 14.09 
CANADA 30 7.31 5 21.13 
CHILE 30 5.63 5 14.7 
COLOMBIA 4 2.73 3 11.58 
DENMARK 30 6.32 2 21.55 
EGYPT 2 N/A 2 11.34 
FINLAND 30 8 3 21.49 
FRANCE 30 7.42 3 19.67 
GERMANY 30 8.47 1 20.44 
GREECE 30 7.96 2 14.91 
HONG KONG 30 8.58 5 19.11 
INDIA 30 6.05 5 12.8 
INDONESIA 30 5.51 2 9.16 
IRELAND 30 6.17 4 18.92 
ISRAEL 15 6.35 3 16.54 
ITALY 30 5.39 1 17.23 
JAPAN 30 5.9 4 20.36 
JORDAN 3 N/A 1 12.54 
MALAYSIA 30 6.35 4 16.67 
MEXICO 14 5.15 1 12.82 
NETHERLANDS 30 8.63 2 21.67 
NEW ZEALAND 29 6.98 4 21.55 
NORWAY 30 7.13 4 21.78 
PAKISTAN 10 N/A 5 8.98 
PERU 8 N/A 3 10.1 
PHILIPPINES 30 4.56 3 8.51 
PORTUGAL 25 5.89 3 17.2 
SINGAPORE 30 7.93 4 19.53 
SOUTH AFRICA 30 6.8 5 14.51 
SOUTH KOREA 29 6.63 2 14.23 
SPAIN 30 6.46 4 17.13 
SRI LANKA 13 N/A 3 10.4 
SWEDEN 30 8.39 3 21.56 
SWITZERLAND 30 7.76 2 21.91 
TAIWAN 9 7.07 3 17.62 
THAILAND 30 4.86 2 12.94 
TURKEY 30 5.4 2 11.84 
UK 30 6.94 5 20.41 
US 30 8.74 5 20.85 
VENEZUELA 2 3.33 1 13.33 
ZIMBABWE 3 N/A 3 11.59 
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As a rule, the firm-level financial information is taken from the Disclosure 
Worldscope database. This database is updated monthly and it provides detailed firm-
level financial information about publicly traded stock companies around the world. The 
most recently available annual data in a 10-year period (1992~2002) are used to construct 
my dataset. Only firms that are currently active and firms that have been in business for 
the past ten years are included in the dataset28. In addition, the following types of firms 
are excluded from the data set: 
• Firms that have been acquired by other firms in the past ten years; 
• Firms that have been involved in major mergers in the past ten years; 
• Firms that are state owned or have the state as one of the major 
shareholders; 
• Firms that have less than six yearly financial reports for the past ten years 
in Worldscope; 
• Firms that do not report shareholder information. 
In each country, up to thirty firms of different sizes are sampled. Due to data 
availability, some developing countries have less than thirty firms in the sample (Table 
11). Since firm size varies significantly across countries, the following rule of sampling is 
applied: for countries with plenty of companies available in Worldscope, ten large 
companies (in order of their current common equity value), ten medium-sized companies 
(with common equity at around US$ 500 million) and ten small companies (in order of 
                                                 
28 This is a general rule. In some cases, data are missing from a firm’s financial reports. Also, for some 
developing countries that have relatively small number of companies in the database, this rule is relaxed to 
six years in order to accommodate more companies from those countries. 
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their current common equity value) are randomly sampled; for countries with relatively 
limited number of firms in Worldscope, I generally go through each of their firms 
included in Worldscope. During the sampling process, only about 10% of firms whose 
financial reports I went through provide sufficient information for the purpose of this 
research. Therefore, while the size of my data set accounts for about 5% of the firms from 
the 45 countries in Worldscope, the sampling process covers up to 10,700 firms, roughly 
50% of all the firms from those countries in the database. 
All the firms in the data set are publicly traded stockholding companies. These 
companies are classified as industrial, bank, utility, transportation and other financial 
companies respectively, and their primary businesses spread in 387 different four-digit 
SIC industries. Table 12 presents the industry distribution of firms in the sample. 
 
Table 12: Industry Distribution of Firms in the Sample 
 
Industry Classification Number of Firms in the Sample 
Industrial 743 
Bank 93 
Utility 73 
Transportation 44 
Other Financial 117 
  
Total Number of Firms 1070 
Unique 4-digit SIC Industries 387 
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Table 13: Variable Description and Source 
 
Variable Name Variable Description 
5C  Variable to measure ownership concentration in a firm. It is equal to the percentage of a firm’s 
outstanding common stocks owned by the top five shareholders. Most countries have a 5% disclosure 
rule. So only shareholders who hold at least 5% of the firm's common stocks are included when 
calculating C5. For firms with less than 5 such big shareholders, only shares of those who do are counted. 
Source: WorldScope Database. 
Dbank Bank dummy, equal to 1 if the firm is a bank. Source: WorldScope Database. 
Duti Utility dummy, equal to 1 if the firm is a utility company. Source: WorldScope Database. 
Dtran Transportation dummy, equal to 1 if the firm is a transportation firm. Source: WorldScope Database. 
Dother Dummy of other financial firms, equal to 1 if the firm is classified as in other financial industries. Source: 
WorldScope Database. 
AUDIT Variable to measure a firm’s auditing practice. It equals 2 if the firm’s auditor is one of the “big six” 
auditing companies and if the firm’s auditing report is qualified; 1 if one of the two conditions is met; 0 
otherwise. Source: WorldScope Database. 
SIZE Firm size, measured by its common equity value (in thousand US$). 10-year (1992~2002) average of the 
firm’s common equity (SIZEa) is the primary measurement of this variable. An alternative measurement, 
SIZEc - current common equity value - is used in robustness checks. Source: WorldScope Database. 
LOG-SIZE The natural log of firm size. 
RETURN Accounting rate of return on equity. In the primary regression model, 10-year average of the firm's return 
on equity (RETURNe) is used. For the purpose of robustness check, the data set also contains 
information about the firm's average return on assets (RETURNa) in the past 10 years. Source: 
WorldScope Database. 
STDEV Instability of the firm’s accounting profit rate, measured by the standard deviation of its annual 
accounting rates of return. In the primary regression model, standard deviation of return on equity 
(STDEVe) in the past 10 years is used. Information about the standard deviation of return on assets 
(STDEVa) is available and used for robustness check. Source: WorldScope Database. 
PRE/CAP Ratio of preferred stocks in the firm’s total capital. Source: WorldScope Database. 
INT Five year average of the firm’s effective interest rate. Source: WorldScope Database. 
ADE_STOCK Measure of the adequacy of financing to companies through stock market in a country, calculated as the 
stock market capitalization divided by gross private domestic investment (as of 2000). Source: World 
Bank Data & Statistics. 
LEGALITY Measure of the effectiveness of law enforcement in a country. It is the composite of five individual 
variables that measure different aspects of law enforcement in a country: efficiency of judiciary system 
(L1), rule of law (L2), corruption (L3), risk of expropriation (L4), and risk of contract repudiation (L5). 
Principle component analysis suggests the following formula to calculate this index: LEGALITY= 
.381*(Efficiency of judicial system)+ .5778*(Rule of law)+ .5031*(Corruption)+ .3468*(Risk of 
expropriation)+ .3842*(Risk of contract repudiation). Higher value of legality index indicates better 
quality of law enforcement in a country. Sources: La Porta et al. (1997), Berkowitz et al. (2003). 
LEG_BOOK Measure of the availability of laws on book to protect shareholder rights. The range for the index is from 
zero to six. High value of this variable indicates that a country’s legal system favors shareholders against 
firm controllers in the corporate decision-making process. Source: La Porta et al. (1997). 
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Measurements of variables are constructed in ways that are consistent with Qu 
(2004b)’s model and with common practice in the literature. Table 13 describes the 
variables used in this study. The dependent variable, corporate ownership concentration, 
is measured following Demsetz and Lehn (1985). - percentage of shares controlled by 
top five shareholders – is used as the primary measurement. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
also use and the Herfindahl index as alternative measures of ownership 
concentration. Since Worldscope only reports information about major shareholders of a 
firm and a 5% disclosure rule is usually applied in most of the countries, measurements 
of and Herfindahl index can’t be obtained. But since the correlations between these 
alternative measurements are likely to be high (Demsetz and Lehn (1985)), econometric 
findings using these alternative measures are possibly similar. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
apply a logistic transformation to  – LN(C5/(1-C5)) – in their regression analysis. I 
implement similar transformation when testing the robustness of my results. For the 
purpose of comparing my results to past work on managerial ownership, I also construct 
a measure of managerial ownership, MGMTOWN, which takes the value of the 
percentage of shares owned by the firm’s directors and top officers. 
5C
20C
20C
5C
I use two basic approaches to get the measurements of legal protection on 
investor rights in a country: LAW_BOOK and LEGALITY. The first variable measures 
the quality of laws on book designed to protect investor rights, and the second measures 
the effectiveness of law enforcement in a country. Data about these two variables in 
different countries are taken directly from the literature. La Porta et al. (1997) examine 
legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these 
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rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. They assemble a data set 
covering legal rules pertaining to the rights of investors, and to the quality of enforcement 
of these rules, in 49 countries that have publicly traded companies. They also create 
shareholder and creditor rights indices for each country. Using these data, they find 
evidence of systematic variation in laws, regulations and their enforcement quality across 
countries. The current study uses La Porta et al. (1998) as the basic source for data about 
LAW_BOOK. This variable ranges from 0 to 6 with higher value indicating that a 
country’s legal system favors shareholders against firm controllers in the corporate 
decision-making process. 
La Porta et al. (1997) also propose five different variables to measure the quality 
of law enforcement (LEGALITY) in a country: efficiency of judiciary system, rule of 
law, corruption, risk of expropriation, and risk of contract repudiation. The correlations 
between these variables are high. To deal with this problem, I follow Berkowitz et al. 
(2003) and use the principal component technique to construct a composite legality proxy 
(LEGALITY). It ranges from 8.51 to 21.91 with higher value indicating more effective 
law enforcement. Natural log value of this variable is used in the regression analysis. For 
the purpose of robustness checks, regression results that use the five separate legality 
proxies (L1, L2, L3, L4, and L5 respectively) are also reported. 
I have two measures of firm size. The primary measurement (SIZEa) is calculated 
as the ten-year average of the firm’s common equity (in thousand US$). The natural log 
value of this variable is used in regressions. For the purpose of robustness checks, the 
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current (usually as of December 31, 2002) common equity value of the firm (SIZEc) is 
used as an alternative measurement of firm size. 
The primary measurement of the firm’s rate of return, RETURNe, is given by the 
ten-year average of the firm’s annual accounting rate of return on equity. I also construct 
an alternative measurement of this variable, RETURNa, by calculating the ten-year 
average of the firm’s return on assets for the purpose of robustness checks. Accordingly, I 
have two measures of the instability of the firm’s return: STDEVe and STDEVa, which 
are the standard deviations of the firm’s accounting rate of return on equity and return on 
assets in the past ten years respectively. 
The firm-level investor protection, AUDIT, is measured by a discrete variable that 
describes the auditing practice in a firm. This variable is the sum of two dummy 
variables: the auditor dummy which equals one if the firm’s auditor is one of the “big 
six” auditing companies and zero otherwise; the auditor’s report dummy which equals 
one if the auditor’s report is qualified and zero otherwise. Therefore, this variable takes 
one of the three values: 0, 1, and 2, with higher value indicating better auditing practice 
thus more effective firm-level investor protection. 
Measurement of the cost of debt financing, INT, is given by the five-year average 
of the firm’s effective interest rate (annual). 
Measure of the adequacy of the stock market in a country, ADE_STOCK, is 
calculated as the country’s stock market capitalization divided by its gross private 
domestic investment (as of 2000). High value of this variable indicates that the stock 
market in this country provides adequate financing for firms. This measure is only 
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available in 39 countries, thus regressions involving this variable have less observations 
than others. 
 
4.4. Main Findings 
4.4.1. Simple Treatment of Data 
 
Table 14 gives the summary statistics of variables involved in the regression 
analysis.  
 
Table 14: Summary Statistics of Variables (Primary Measurement) 
Note: * indicates that information about the corresponding variable is available in 39 countries; ** indicates that information about the 
corresponding variable is available in all 45 countries; E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power. 
Variable Name Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Maximum Minimum 
Number of 
Observations 
C5 0.49 0.50 0.26 1 0 1070 
SIZEa (1000 US$) 1.33E+06 2.82E+05 3.76E+06 6.24E+7 285.9 1063 
LOG-SIZEa 19.12 19.46 2.17 24.86 12.56 1063 
RETURNe 0.09 0.11 0.27 1.50 -1.78 1064 
STDEVe 0.28 0.12 0.62 12.88 0 1070 
PRE/CAP 0.01 0 0.05 0.96 0 1044 
INT 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.92 0 884 
AUDIT 0.78 1 0.46 2 0 1070 
  
Country-specific Variables 
ADE_STOCK  6.40 6.46 1.55 8.74 2.73 39* 
L1 (Efficiency of Judiciary 
System)  7.78 8.00 2.10 10.00 2.50 45** 
L2 (Rule of Law) 6.90 7.80 2.84 10.00 0.00 45** 
L3 (Corruption) 7.11 7.38 2.26 10.00 2.15 45** 
L4 (Risk of Expropriation) 8.22 8.31 1.53 9.98 5.22 45** 
L5 (Risk of Contract 
Repudiation) 7.75 8.57 1.73 9.98 4.68 45** 
LEGALITY 16.42 17.13 4.29 21.91 8.51 45** 
LEG_BOOK 3.04 3 1.35 5 0 45** 
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Inspection of ownership data reveals that, corporate ownership concentration 
( ) varies widely across firms and countries, ranging from 0 to 100%. The mean value 
of  is around 50% in the sample. This implies that ownership is fairly concentrated in 
the majority of firms instead of being dispersed. This picture of corporate ownership 
structure around the world resembles that of La Porta et al. (1999) and differs from Berle 
and Means (1932)’s description of dispersed ownership. 
5C
5C
Simple treatment of data reveals that corporate ownership concentration varies 
systematically with respect to investor protection and development of stock market across 
countries as expected. In countries with weak legal system, corporate ownership 
concentration is relatively high. This can be seen from Figure 8. The horizontal axis in 
Figure 8 measures the legality in a country, and on the vertical axis is the percentage of 
firms with  value greater or equal to 50% in that country. The slope is clearly negative 
with R-square value equal to 0.28. Table 15 tells the same story as Figure 8 does. In 
Table 15, a country has “high legality” if its LEGALITY value is greater than the sample 
average (16.42) of all the countries; “low legality” if otherwise. Similarly, a country is 
categorized in “high ownership concentration” if the percentage of firms with high 
ownership concentration (  greater or equal to 50%) in that country is greater than the 
sample mean of all the countries; “low ownership concentration” if otherwise. Most of 
the countries (31 out of 45) fall in the “high-low” category or “low-high” category. In 
other words, firms are more likely to have high ownership concentration in countries with 
less effective investor protection, and vice versa. 
5C
5C
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Figure 8: Legal Protection and Ownership Concentration 
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Table 15: Legal Protection and Ownership Concentration 
 
  High Ownership Concentration Low Ownership Concentration 
High Legality 7 15 
Low Legality 16 7 
 
 
Figure 9 and Table 16 reveal the similar pattern regarding the relation between 
ownership concentration and the adequacy of stock market in a country. A negative 
relation between these two variables is clearly present. 
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Figure 9: Adequacy of Stock Market and Ownership Concentration 
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Table 16: Adequacy of Stock Market and Ownership Concentration 
 
  High Ownership Concentration Low Ownership Concentration 
Highly Developed Stock Market 3 16 
Poorly Developed Stock Market 20 6 
 
While inspection of data confirms the expected relations between ownership 
concentration and the two country-level variables, it must be noted that without 
controlling for the firm-level variables that have an impact on ownership concentration, 
the patterns revealed by such simple treatment of data can be illusionary. To derive more 
reliable conclusions, multivariable regression analysis is needed29. 
                                                 
29 One caveat of La Porta et al. (1999)’s study is that they do not make efforts to control for firm-specific 
variables that may also affect a firm’s ownership structure. 
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 4.4.2. Multivariable OLS Regression Analysis 
 
The trends suggested by the simple treatment of data are confirmed by 
multivariable OLS regression analysis. Table 17 reports the OLS estimation results using 
different model specifications. All regressions correct for possible correlation of the 
errors at the country level. The dependent variable is ownership concentration ( ). In 
the raw data, a few observations have exceptionally high (>=100%) or low (<=-100%) 
returns on equity. These “outliers” are removed from the data used in regressions. The 
main estimation results are not sensitive to this cutoff. 
5C
The relation between ownership concentration and proxies of investor protection 
is negative as expected (regression (1) through (6) in Table 17) after controlling for other 
variables that possibly affect ownership concentration. The coefficient estimate on 
legality is negative and highly significant (1% significance level). The coefficient 
estimate of law on books is also negative and significant. These results suggest that both 
the quality of laws on book and the effectiveness of their enforcement are important 
determinants of firms’ ownership concentration in a country. Specifically, ceteris 
paribus, 1% improvement in legality of a country will lead to 0.13~0.17% reduction in 
corporate ownership concentration in that country. 
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Table 17: OLS Regression Analysis 
Note: dependent variable is C5; standard errors (in parentheses) adjust for heteroscedasticity; SIZE, ADE_STOCK, LEGALITY are 
natural log values; E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power; *** indicates a significance level of 1%; ** indicates a 
significance level of 5%; * indicates a significance level of 10%. 
Regressions Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CONSTANT -0.88 
(0.59) 
1.86*** 
(0.11) 
-0.83 
(0.59) 
-0.53 
(0.60) 
-0.79 
(0.59) 
-1.12* 
(0.61) 
INDUSTRY 
DUMMIES INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
SIZE 0.26*** 
(0.06) 
-0.02*** 
(0.39E-02) 
0.25*** 
(0.06) 
0.23*** 
(0.06) 
0.25*** 
(0.06) 
0.29*** 
(0.06) 
SQU_SIZE -0.73E-02*** 
(0.15E-02)  
-0.73E-02*** 
(0.15E-02) 
-0.67E-02*** 
(0.15E-02) 
-0.72E-02*** 
(0.15E-02) 
-0.82E-02*** 
(0.15E-02) 
RETURN 0.03 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
SQU_RETURN   -0.11 (0.09)    
STDEV -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
SQU_STDEV   0.05 (0.05)    
AUDIT    0.05*** (0.02)   
PRE/CAP     0.34*** (0.12) 
0.14 
(0.19) 
INTEREST      -0.02* (0.01) 
ADE_STOCK -0.21*** 
(0.05) 
-0.24*** 
(0.05) 
-0.20*** 
(0.05) 
-0.20*** 
(0.05) 
-0.21*** 
(0.05) 
-0.24*** 
(0.06) 
LAW_BOOK -0.01** 
(0.58E-02) 
-0.01** 
(0.58E-02) 
-0.01** 
(0.57E-02) 
-0.02*** 
(0.58E-02) 
-0.02*** 
(0.59E-02) 
-0.11* 
(0.64E-02) 
LEGALITY -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
-0.15*** 
(0.04) 
-0.15*** 
(0.04) 
-0.17*** 
(0.04) 
-0.14*** 
(0.04) 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
        
R-square 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.21 
F test 21.22 20.14 18.20 20.75 20.34 16.28 
Observations 999 999 999 976 976 823 
 
The development of a country’s stock market is another country-specific variable 
that is empirically significant in explaining corporate ownership concentration in that 
country. In countries with more advanced stock market, corporate ownership 
concentration is significantly lower than in other countries. Specifically, if the adequacy 
of stock market improves by 1%, corporate ownership concentration will decrease by 
0.13~0.17% in general, ceteris paribus. 
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Firm size has a negative overall effect on ownership concentration (regression (2) 
in Table 17). Since natural-log value is used in regressions, the coefficient estimation on 
this variable can be explained as 1% increase in a firm’s common equity leading to about 
0.02 percentage point decrease in ownership concentration. Furthermore, significant 
nonlinearity is detected when including quadratic form of this variable in the regressions 
(regression (1), (3), (4), (5) and (6)). The turning point is around 17.36. Compare this to 
the sample mean (19.12) of LOGSIZE and it appears that the negative relation between 
firm size and ownership concentration is more likely to exist for medium to large firms 
than for small firms. 
Similar to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), strong industry fixed effect is detected in the 
banking sector. The coefficient on the bank dummy is negative across all model 
specifications. This suggests that compared to other types of firms, banks have relatively 
low ownership concentration around the world. This is consistent with the fact that the 
banking sector is generally under special regulation for most of the countries in the 
sample. I also include in the regressions other industry dummies that indicate whether a 
firm is in the utility, other financial, or transportation industries. Coefficient estimates on 
these variables are generally insignificant. 
Coefficient estimates on the accounting profit rate and its instability take expected 
signs (regressions (1) through (6) in Table 17). The accounting profit rate is found to be 
positively related to ownership concentration, while the instability of profit rate is 
negatively related to ownership concentration. Both results are consistent with Qu 
(2004b)’s model and are in contrast to Demsetz and Lehn (1985)’s results. However, it 
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must be noted that coefficient estimates on both variables are statistically not different 
from zero. 
Other firm-specific variables that are empirically significant include the firm’s 
auditing practice, and whether preferred stocks account for a significant portion of the 
firm’s total capital. In firms under better auditing (for instance, the firm chooses one of 
the “big six” auditing firms as its auditor and/or the firm’s auditing report is qualified), 
ownership concentration is found to be significantly higher than other firms. This 
evidence supports the hypothesis that both the firm’s auditing practice and its ownership 
concentration are choice variables as investors make decisions about how to best protect 
themselves from potential agency problem. OLS regressions also suggest that when a 
firm is engaged in extensive issuance of preferred stocks to investors, the ownership 
concentration in terms of common stocks tends to be high. The coefficient estimate on 
the effective interest rate is negative as expected, which suggests that when a firm has 
access to credits at low cost, its ownership tends to be less dispersed. But this result 
should be treated with caution given the fact that the coefficient estimate on this variable 
is empirically insignificant. 
In general, multivariate OLS regression analysis confirms Qu (2004b)’s model 
predictions. The coefficient estimates all take the expected signs and the overall 
estimation model is highly significant. Some of Demsetz and Lehn (1985)’s results are 
robust with the inclusion of country-level determinants in a cross-country setting, while 
some of their results are in contrast to the findings documented here. In addition, my 
results support strongly the idea that, after controlling for firm-specific variables, 
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corporate ownership concentration varies systematically with the development of stock 
market and the effectiveness of legal protection on investor rights in a country. 
 
4.4.3. IV Estimation 
 
Until now legal protection on investor rights has been treated as being exogenous 
in the OLS regressions. However, the potential endogeneity problem with the 
effectiveness of investor protection in a country has been recognized by various studies. 
One recent working paper by Laeven and Woodruff (2003) proposes that larger firms 
may demand a better legal system. It may also be true that when corporate ownership 
spreads in a larger group of investors, there is greater demand for more protective legal 
institutions. Thus low ownership concentration and large number of owners may play a 
role in causing a strong legal system to come forward. In other words, the effectiveness 
of investor protection can be endogenous itself and the causality relation assumed by the 
OLS procedure can actually be the other way around. This endogeneity problem may 
cause OLS estimator to be biased and inconsistent. 
To tackle this endogeneity issue, I construct instrumental variables and implement 
a standard 2SLS procedure to estimate variable coefficients. Since the possible 
endogeneity problem involves the variables measuring legal protection on investor rights 
in a country, and the relation between ownership concentration and investor protection is 
of primary interest in this paper, I focus on instrumenting for LEGALITY and 
LAW_BOOK, i.e. to find variables that are highly correlated to these two variables but 
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are independent with other variables. New development in the literature of law and 
finance suggests a number of candidates, two of which are more relevant than others for 
the purpose of this study. The first one is the origin of a country’s legal system. It has 
been argued since La Porta et al. (1997) that investor protection is more effective in 
countries with English common law origin than countries with other legal origins, such as 
French civil law origin. Dummy variables about whether the legal institutions in a 
country have English common law origin or French civil law origin can be good 
instruments for the quality of laws on book as well as the effectiveness of law 
enforcement in a country. Along another line of inquiry, Berkowitz et al. (2003) study the 
so-called “transplant effect”. They find that how a country’s legal institutions were 
originally formed has a persistent effect on legality of that country. For countries whose 
legal institutions were unreceptively transplanted from other countries, legality is 
generally low. Based on this argument, I construct an “unreceptive-transplant” dummy 
variable as instrument for LEGALITY in the IV estimation. 
Table 18 presents the results of IV estimation using the dummy variable for 
English common law origin and the dummy variable for “unreceptive-transplant” as 
instruments for LEGALITY and LAW_BOOK. All regressions correct for possible 
correlation of the errors at the country level. The dependent variable is ownership 
concentration ( ). 2SLS estimation results highly resemble the OLS estimation results. 
All the coefficient estimates retain their signs and significance level as in OLS 
regressions. The absolute value of coefficient estimate on legality is somewhat higher 
than that in OLS regressions. This seems to suggest that after the endogeneity problem 
5C
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being accounted for, the real effect of legality on corporate ownership concentration is 
greater than that shown in the OLS regressions. 
 
Table 18: 2SLS Estimation (Instrumental Variables) 
Note: dependent variable is C5; standard errors (in parentheses) adjust for heteroscedasticity; SIZE, ADE_STOCK, LEGALITY are 
natural log values; instrumental variables for LEGALITY and LAW_BOOK are: dummy variable for unreceptive transplant and 
dummy variable for English common law countries; E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power; *** indicates a 
significance level of 1%; ** indicates a significance level of 5%; * indicates a significance level of 10%. 
Variables Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
CONSTANT -0.79 
(0.60) 
1.95*** 
(0.13) 
-0.73 
(0.61) 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
SIZE 0.25*** 
(0.06) 
-0.02*** 
(0.40E-02) 
0.25*** 
(0.06) 
SQU_SIZE -0.73E-02*** 
(0.15E-02) 
 -0.72E-02*** 
(0.15E-02) 
RETURN 0.03 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
SQU_RETURN   -0.12 
(0.09) 
STDEV -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
SQU_STDEV   0.06 
(0.05) 
ADE_STOCK -0.19*** 
(0.06) 
-0.21*** 
(0.06) 
-0.18** 
(0.06) 
LAW_BOOK -0.01 
(0.84E-02) 
-0.01 
(0.86E-02) 
-0.01 
(0.84E-02) 
LEGALITY -0.16*** 
(0.06) 
-0.20*** 
(0.06) 
-0.18*** 
(0.06) 
     
R-square 0.19 0.17 0.19 
F test 21.15 19.95 18.12 
Observations 999 999 999 
 
 
4.4.4. Ownership Concentration Vs. Managerial Ownership 
 
The distinction between ownership concentration and managerial ownership 
hasn’t been clear in the literature when studying firm ownership structure. Qu (2004b) 
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argues that it is critical to make a distinction between these two variables. For the purpose 
of revealing a firm’s governance arrangements, ownership concentration – shares owned 
by big shareholders – is more relevant than managerial ownership. My empirical results 
support this argument. For the 373 firms in my sample that also report information about 
managerial ownership (MGMTOWN), I detect a negative correlation (correl = -0.127) 
between these two variables. When  is replaced with MGMTOWN as dependent 
variable in the regressions, most of the observed relations disappear and the coefficient 
estimates become empirically insignificant
5C
30. 
 
4.5. Robustness Checks 
 
The main estimation results are robust across different model specifications and 
variable measurements. Table 19 reports the results for further robustness checks. 
Regression (1) in Table 19 gives the coefficient estimates when the firm size is measured 
by its current common equity value (SIZEc) instead of the 10-year average. In regression 
(2), 10-year average of return on assets (RETURNa) and its standard deviation 
(STDEVa) are used to measure the firm’s accounting profit rate and its instability. 
Regressions (3) through (6) use separate legality proxies to replace the composite legality 
index. 
 
                                                 
30 The estimation results using managerial ownership as dependent variable are available from the author 
upon request. 
 98
Table 19: Robustness Checks 
Note: dependent variable is C5; standard errors (in parentheses) adjust for heteroscedasticity; SIZE, ADE_STOCK, LEGALITY, L1, 
L3, L4, L5 are natural log values; E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power; *** indicates a significance level of 1%; ** 
indicates a significance level of 5%; * indicates a significance level of 10%. 
Variables Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CONSTANT -0.16 
(0.40) 
-0.83 
(0.57) 
-1.02* 
(0.60) 
-1.00* 
(0.60) 
-0.56 
(0.60) 
-0.52 
(0.59) 
INDUSTRY 
DUMMIES INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
SIZEa  0.25*** 
(0.06) 
0.25*** 
(0.06) 
0.25*** 
(0.06) 
0.24*** 
(0.06) 
0.23*** 
(0.06) 
SIZEc 0.18*** 
(0.04) 
     
SQU_SIZEa  -0.72E-02*** 
(0.15E-02) 
-0.73E-02*** 
(0.15E-02) 
-0.73E-02*** 
(0.15E-02) 
-0.70E-02*** 
(0.15E-02) 
-0.67E-02*** 
(0.15E-02) 
SQU_SIZEc -0.55E-02*** 
(0.10E-02) 
     
RETURNe 0.06 
(0.04) 
 0.05 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
RETURNa  0.16** 
(0.08) 
    
STDEVe -0.02 
(0.03) 
 -0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
STDEVa  0.19E-02 
(0.03) 
    
PRE/CAP 0.40*** 
(0.13) 
0.34*** 
(0.12) 
0.33*** 
(0.12) 
0.34*** 
(0.13) 
0.34*** 
(0.12) 
0.35*** 
(0.12) 
ADE_STOCK -0.21*** 
(0.05) 
-0.21*** 
(0.05) 
-0.25*** 
(0.05) 
-0.24*** 
(0.05) 
-0.20*** 
(0.05) 
-0.16*** 
(0.05) 
LAW_BOOK -0.02*** 
(0.59E-02) 
-0.02** 
(0.59E-02) 
-0.01* 
(0.60E-02) 
-0.01** 
(0.59E-02) 
-0.02*** 
(0.60E-02) 
-0.02*** 
(0.60E-02) 
LEGALITY -0.14*** 
(0.04) 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
    
L1   -0.08*** 
(0.03) 
   
L3    -0.08*** 
(0.02) 
  
L4     -0.27*** 
(0.06) 
 
L5      -0.30*** 
(0.05) 
        
R-square 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.22 
F test 21.12 20.61 19.96 19.99 21.11 22.19 
Observations 974 974 974 974 974 974 
 
The OLS and IV estimation results reported in part 4.4 persist under these 
alternative model specifications and variable measurements. The coefficient estimates 
retain their signs and significance level. Among the five separate variables that measure 
the effectiveness of a country’s law enforcement, efficiency of judicial system (L1), 
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corruption (L3), risk of expropriation (L4), and risk of contract repudiation (L5) are 
found to be negatively related to corporate ownership concentration and these relations 
are empirically significant. Not reported in Table 19 is a replication of Table 17’s results 
in which logistic transformation of  is used as the dependent variable. The main 
results are not sensitive to this transformation
5C
31. 
 
4.6. Conclusions 
 
Using a newly constructed data set of 1070 stock companies from 45 countries 
around the world, this paper substantially expands Demsetz and Lehn (1985)’s results 
and shows that the variation in corporation ownership concentration across firms and 
countries can be explained considerably by firm-specific economic variables that have an 
impact on the governance arrangement in the firm and certain country-specific variables. 
Among the firm-specific variables that are empirically significant are firm size, its 
quadratic form, whether or not a firm is in certain industries, the firm’s auditing practice, 
and whether or not preferred stocks account for a significant portion of the firm’s total 
capital. After controlling for these firm-specific variables, I find that ownership 
concentration varies systematically across countries depending on the development of a 
country’s stock market, the quality of the country’s legal institutions to protect investor 
rights and the effectiveness of law enforcement. These results are robust across different 
                                                 
31 The estimation results using logistic transformation of  as dependent variable are available from the 
author upon request. 
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model specifications and variable measurements. The empirical findings in this paper 
provide positive evidence in support of Qu (2004b)’s model and are consistent with La 
Porta et al. (1999)’s idea that ownership arrangement is a substitute for legal institutions 
as a mechanism to protect investor rights. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Risk-neutral Controller and Risk-neutral Investors 
 
Consider a situation where both the controller and investors (as a whole) are risk 
neutral. Solve the model starting with the controller’s optimization problem at date 2. The 
controller’s utility function increases with his/her income. Therefore, for a risk-neutral 
controller, his/her problem at date 2 is to maximize his/her expected payoff, , by 
choosing the level of tunneling. Other variables (such as
( )WE
α , R , E , p , and V ) are 
exogenous to the controller. 
 
The controller’s problem at date 2: 
 [ ] ( ) ]
2
)(1[
2
pV
TTTERMaxWEMax
TT
−+−+= α    (A.1) 
 
The first-order condition is given by: 
 [ ] 0)1(1 =+−−=∂
∂ R
pV
T
T
WE α  
( ) ))1(1(,,, RpVRVpT +−==⇒ ααϕ      (A.2) 
One can easily see that *T is a maximum solution to (A.1) by checking the 
second-order condition of (A.1). Maximum tunneling occurs when α is zero. (T.2) 
ensures that the controller can not tunnel more than the firm’s equity.  
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  Since negative tunneling is not allowed in this model, T takes the following 
functional form: 
( ) [ ]
⎩⎨
⎧
+∈
+∈+−=
]1),1/(1(
)1/(1,0
0
)11(
R
RRpV
T α
αα
    (A.3) 
At date 1, α is chosen by investors in the market to maximize the firm’s expected 
value, . The optimization problem is given by[ ]ΠE 32: 
 
Investors’ optimization problem at date 1: 
 [ ] ( ) ( )( )αϕα ,,,1))(1(max RVpERTERE −+=−+=Π   (A.4) 
 
Since R and E are exogenous, this optimization problem is equivalent to 
minimizing T by choosingα . Given that T  is non-negative and given that the resource 
tunneled out of the firm is non-productive and it reduces the total amount of investment 
which generates a positive expected rate of return, the first-best solution will be that *T is 
minimized to be zero. It is obvious from (A.3) that the first-best outcome is achieved by 
choosing α to be within ( ) ]1,11[ R+  at date 1. There is no tunneling in equilibrium 
and the firm’s expected value is maximized. 
Therefore, under the assumption that both investors and the controller are risk-
neutral, the problem of tunneling is resolved completely by the controller owning a stake 
of the firm’s equity that is high enough. In this case, tunneling decreases monotonically 
                                                 
32 Both participation constraints for the controller and small shareholders are satisfied and non-binding in 
this case. 
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 with respect toα when α is in the closed set ( ) ]11,0[ R+ . Intuitively, ownership 
concentration on the controller aligns the controller’s interest to the firm. This reduces the 
controller’s incentive to tunnel, because he/she will be tunneling partially from 
himself/herself. In this case, ownership concentration on the controller only has one 
effect on tunneling - the “alignment effect”. This effect increases monotonically with 
α and the marginal alignment effect is constant in the closed set ( ) ]11,0[ R+ . In Figure 
10, T decreases linearly withα , and is chosen such that the marginal alignment effect 
is zero. 
*α
T  Marginal 
alignment 
effect  
 
Figure 10: Alignment Effect of Ownership Concentration on Tunneling When the 
Controller Is Risk Neutral 
pV  
0 0 1/(1+R) α
)1( RpV +
α1 11/(1+R) 
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